Syria
The Israeli newspaper Haaretz on August 10, quoting unnamed
Israeli military officials, reported that Syria is developing a
new class of surface-to-surface missiles. The new missiles are
reportedly being developed with technical assistance from Iran
and will have a range of more than 500 kilometers (310 miles).
Fired from mobile launchers, of which Syria has 60, these
missiles will be able to strike any point inside Israel and reach
targets as far away as Ankara, Turkey.
In 1983, the Syrians received a batch of SS-21 Scud-B missiles
from the Soviet Union. These only have a range of 120 kilometers
(75 miles) and are accurate to within 50 meters. This means that
only Syrian Scuds placed close to the Golan cease-fire line
dividing Syria from Israel could hit southern Israel where the
Israelis are believed to have their strategic missiles deployed.
This makes the Scud, Syria's main strategic deterrent, very
vulnerable to Israeli air power. Rumors have persisted since
1989 that Damascus was attempting to import the M-9 short-range
ballistic missile from China to alleviate this tactical problem.
The M-9 is a very accurate, advanced, mobile, solid-fuel missile
with a 500 kilometer (310 mile) range. However, after receiving a
substantial amount of U.S. pressure, Beijing reportedly backed
out of the deal.
Iran however, is believed to have developed its new indigenous
missile, the Shahab-3, with assistance from Pakistan, who, in
turn, is believed to have copied the missile from China's M-9.
One significant improvement offered by the Iranian missile is
better guidance. Another is, of course, longer range. If the
new Syrian missile under production is anything like these other
"indigenously" developed missiles, then the strategic situation
will shift dramatically. This would mean that Syrian Scuds could
hit any part of Israel from a larger launching box and, more
importantly, that the missiles could hit their targets more
precisely.
But despite the possible technical advancements, it is important
to note that the development of this missile does not inherently
raise the chance that the Israeli-Syria peace deal will fall
through. Syrian President Hafez Assad is known to hedge his bets,
always pursuing multiple and simultaneous tracks in his foreign
policy. On one hand he is making peace with Israel. On the other
he is equipping his nation to gain greater strategic flexibility.
This is neither surprising, nor necessarily alarming to the
Israelis. So why mention it?
The reasons for reporting this story are three-fold. First, this
is a simple acknowledgement that Israel is well aware of what is
going on and is nobody's fool. Israel is not going into
negotiations blindly, and when dealing with Syria, Israel will
verify more than trust.
This is a message to Damascus, but it is also a message to the
Israeli public. Ironically, reporting the new Syrian missile
capability is an attempt to undermine opposition to the peace
process. In acknowledging the story first, the Barak
administration can play down any possible political land mines
that the Israeli opposition could lay on the road to peace. It
does not mean that the issue will not come up during the process,
but it does portray the administration as pragmatic and aware of
the strategic environment in which it is negotiating.
The report also serves to reinforce Turkish-Israeli relations. As
mentioned before, the new missiles, if mounted on mobile
launchers, have the capability to hit a large portion of Turkey,
including Ankara. In reporting that Syria is developing a new
missile, Israel is signaling to Turkey that it has not completely
forgotten its military cooperation agreement with Turkey.
Similarly, this message is intended to resonate in Damascus as
well. While Lebanon is up for grabs, Israel does not want the
Israeli-Syrain peace to come at the expense of Turkey. Moreover,
the U.S. does not want the Israeli-Syrian peace to come at the
expense of Turkey, and Israel is not yet ready to abandon U.S.
support.
By publicly conceding the fact that Syrian missile programs are
continuing, the Barak government is not making excuses for
ceasing the peace process, but rather is making it perfectly
clear to the Israeli people, Israel's allies and Syria that peace
will not come at the expense of security.
According to the Israeli and Arab press, Syrian security forces
controlled by Syrian President Hafez Assad's son, Bashar, recently
began a search and arrest campaign against supporters of Rifat
Assad, the president's brother and former vice president. The Sept.
19 crackdown was triggered by apparent attempts by Rifat to promote
himself and his son, challenging the expected ascension of Hafez
Assad's son and chosen heir, Bashar. This rivalry may lead to a
succession struggle that could significantly affect domestic
politics, as well as the country's peace process with Israel.
The power struggle between Rifat and Bashar has arisen alongside
reports of President Hafez Assad's growing health problems.
According to the Sept. 24 Jerusalem Post, Arab sources closely
monitoring Syria say the ailing president is significantly weakened
and has not appeared in public for several days. Also, Syrian
television has begun using archival footage of Assad when referring
to him.
While these reports cannot be confirmed, Assad is known to suffer
from heart and other ailments. On July 23, Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Barak told The Jerusalem Post that it was better to deal with
the "old guard," implying that a generational change could be near
and could impede the peace process.
When Assad suffered a heart attack in 1983, Rifat - then vice
president - staged an unsuccessful bid for power, and was exiled to
Europe until 1992. Rifat, still angered by his removal from the
vice presidency, now wants the presidency. Damascus has perceived
recent actions by Rifat and his son as attempts to gain power,
causing deep anger in the Syrian capital. Rifat showed up at the
funeral for the King of Morocco while President Assad intentionally
stayed away. A few days later, Rifat's son Sumer visited
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in Gaza and promoted mending ties
between Arafat and Assad.
Bashar, a former opthamologist and Assad's chosen successor, has
also made attempts to increase his power, adopting a higher public
profile in Syria and abroad following his accelerated induction
into the military, political, and economic power centers of
Damascus. In an unprecedented show of force, 600 of Bashar's troops
surrounded Rifat's home in Latakia and ordered Rifat loyalists to
give themselves up, threatening them with accusations of
corruption. At last report, Rifat's loyalists, called "the private
militia," were still barricaded inside Rifat's home.
The ruling Syrian Ba'th Party is due to convene in November. Assad
reportedly plans to announce a change in the makeup of the
government and elevate Bashar to a senior post, while decreasing
Rifat's power.
Rifat is trying to avoid further confrontation to prevent this from
happening. He sent a message to the presidential residence at the
height of the siege saying that he did not instruct his followers
to barricade themselves inside his home. Rifat added that he was
still loyal to Assad and said he had no intention of harming the
stability of the Syrian regime.
If the reports of President Assad's failing health are true and he
does not make it until November, the country will certainly witness
a succession crisis, played out as a power struggle between Rifat
and his loyalists and Bashar and his forces. However, it wouldn't
take the president's death to ignite a crisis. Bashar is
only 35 years old, making him five years too young to take over the
presidency by constitutional standards. The succession struggle
could continue until Bashar reaches his 40th birthday.
While this in and of itself is a significant event, it also has
ramifications for the Syria-Israel peace process. Israeli officials
already see rising tensions along the northern border with Lebanon
as a direct threat to peace talks with Damascus. Israeli officials
have seen a reported increase in Hezbollah violence as proof that
Syrian interest in negotiations is waning. Syria has sought the
return of the Golan Heights from Israel in negotiations. In
exchange, Israel has requested security guarantees.
If, somehow, Rifat gains a significant amount of power in the
succession, Syrian-Israeli relations will not progress as they
would under Bashar. Rifat is more anti-Israel than Assad and has
in the past supported Islamic extremists. Bashar tends to align
himself with his father. When interviewed by the Arab daily al-
Wasat, Bashar had no harsh words against Israel, going so far as to
say that if Israeli forces left Southern Lebanon, the military wing
of Hezbollah would wither.
On Oct. 7, the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot reported that Iran
is now bypassing Syria and shipping Katyusha rockets, mortar shells
and other weapons directly to Beirut for Hezbollah guerrillas. The
arms were previously flown to Damascus, where they were loaded onto
trucks and driven into Lebanon. Israeli army officers were "at a
loss" to explain the change, and many suggested the direct route
did not have the approval of Damascus.
Iran may be protecting Hezbollah activity in order to put the
Syrian-Israeli peace process in jeopardy. By circumventing Syria on
an issue crucial to the success of the talks, Iran could seriously
endanger its relationship with Syria. It is unclear exactly why
Iran would risk its relations with Syria. The main reason we find -
that Iran fears loss of influence if Israel improves its regional
relations - seems insufficient to justify this risk.
Throughout the recent resumption of Israeli-Syrian negotiations,
Israel has criticized Syria for standing by while Hezbollah
violence in Lebanon against the Israeli-allied South Lebanon Army
(SLA) increases. On Sept. 23, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak
warned that Hezbollah attacks could jeopardize talks with Syria.
Later, on Sept. 28, an aide to Barak was even more direct, telling
Agence France-Press, "If [Syrian President Hafez] Assad really
wants peace, he should halt the attacks."
Hezbollah has come out against the Israeli-Syrian peace process and
vowed to continue fighting, despite Israeli pledges to withdraw
from Lebanon by July 2000. Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's
secretary-general, was in Iran Oct. 6 and conferred with Iranian
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi. He thanked Kharrazi for Iran's
support and reiterated the need for "an all-out continued
resistance drive" against the occupying Israeli forces.
Shortly after Israel's warnings to Syria, the Yediot Aharonot
reported that Iran had ordered terrorist organizations in southern
Lebanon to join Hezbollah attacks on Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).
These "terrorist organizations" included Amal, which was the
dominant group in southern Lebanon until the more extreme Hezbollah
emerged.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak has stressed his desire for peace
between Israel and Syria. He said peace between the two would serve
as a "strategic breakthrough" for Israel making it more difficult
for hard-line states, such as Iran and Iraq, to justify aggression.
Assad has shown signs of real interest in reaching a peace with
Israel, especially once it became clear that Israel was offering
Syria Lebanon as the reward
[ http://www.stratfor.com/meaf/commentary/m9909161906.htm ].
Israel's price for peace is that Syria curb Hezbollah and other
guerrilla activity in Lebanon. Iran's unwillingness to use Damascus
to filter arms to Hezbollah suggests Assad may have tried to do just
that.
If this is the case, Iran would be risking its strong relations
with Syria. Why Iran would want to do this is far from clear. The
only possible explanation we see at this point is Iran's desire to
enhance its position as an influential force in the region. It has
been waging an aggressive campaign to improve its relations with
GCC states
[ http://www.stratfor.com/meaf/specialreports/special13.htm ] in an
attempt to break out of its isolation. It has proposed regional
mechanisms for collective security and attempted to lead the
Organization of the Islamic Conference to a more active and visible
international
role.
If Israel forges better relationships with its neighbors, Iran
stands to lose a considerable amount of influence in the region.
Iran's leaders realize this and will continue working through
Hezbollah in an attempt to undermine the Middle East peace process.
However, to do so, Iran has circumvented Syria and undermined
Damascus' interests. This clash of Iranian-Syrian agendas threatens
not only the peace process, but also stability in Syria and
relations between Syria and Iran, and will ultimately threaten
Iranian security as well.
Recent indications suggest an improvement in Syrian-Iraqi
relations, which could give Syria a wild card to play against Iran
if it tries to undermine the Middle East peace process. On Sept.
23, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz voiced the country's
intention to improve ties with its Arab brothers, mentioning that
it had already succeeded in improving relations with Syria. There
have also been reports that Iraq sent a message to U.S. President
Clinton that supposedly pledged not to undermine the Middle East
peace process. Iraq and Iran have been at odds since the 1980-88
Iran-Iraq war, and Syria could use ties with Iraq to put Iran back
in line.
It will be interesting to see what stance - if any - Syria takes
concerning the new direct supply route. If Assad is truly
interested in making peace with Israel, we may see Syria attempt to
suppress Hezbollah attacks or put pressure on Lebanon to end the
direct supply from Iran.
On Oct. 17, Jordanian Foreign Minister Abdul-Illah Khatib flew to
Damascus to discuss the Israeli-Syrian peace process with Syrian
President Hafez Assad. Khatib reportedly passed along a message
from King Abdullah II, who met with U.S. President Clinton last
week. A Syrian presidential spokesman did not disclose what was
discussed; however, it is believed that the two discussed a formula
to restart the peace talks.
This was only the latest in a series of apparent attempts by Israel
and Syria to accelerate the peace process through Jordanian mediation.
[ http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/commentary/m9909161906.htm ] Despite
the recent activity, there are signs that direct negotiations
between Israel and Syria are being impeded by each country's
domestic political concerns. Ironically, these are the same
concerns that make it imperative that the peace process be
initiated sooner rather than later.
The major factor both accelerating and impeding the process is the
looming succession crisis resulting from Syrian President Assad's
failing health. Domestic politics in Israel demands its negotiators
garner enough security guarantees to make their planned pullout
from Lebanon next year feasible. This goal is threatened by the
emerging succession crisis, which could result in Syria taking a
harder line in future negotiations. Israeli Intelligence Chief Maj.
Gen. Amos Malka has already expressed concerns about the
deteriorating health of Assad and its possible implications for the
Israeli-Syrian negotiations
[ http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/commentary/m9910142114.htm ].
Meanwhile, concerned that it is losing bargaining leverage due to
Assad's failing health, the Syrian army is modernizing. The army
sees the move both as a way to strengthen Syria's negotiating
position and as a deterrent to any possible future Israeli
hostilities. This action, of course, isn't helping to allay Israeli
mistrust.
Several reports indicate that Syria has been beefing up its
military during the past few months. On Sept. 16, the Jerusalem
Post cited Israeli military and intelligence sources as saying that
Syria was continuing to develop longer-range derivatives of the
Scud C surface-to-surface missiles, capable of delivering chemical
and biological weapons. There are suspicions that both China and
Iran are aiding Syria in this effort. Chinese Defense Minister Chi
Haotian was in Damascus Oct. 16 to discuss military cooperation
with Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass.
Syria is also apparently discussing large-scale arms purchases with
Russia. News of a $2 billion deal was widely reported in June
1999. The purchases are said to include S-300 anti-aircraft missile
systems, MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters, T-80 tanks, and anti-tank
weapons. The aircraft and anti-aircraft systems are particularly
significant, as the Syrian air force is still largely made up of
increasingly antiquated MiG-21 fighter aircraft - which would
likely fare badly against Israel's modern F-15s and F-16s.
Syria has also increased its hard-line rhetoric in recent days,
either to boost its position at the bargaining table or due to real
anti-peace sentiment emanating from certain factions. Some military
and political leaders emphasized that Syria is not prepared to
"sell out" in order to get a deal with Israel.
On Oct. 16, Syrian Army Chief of Staff Ali Aslan said that "under
no circumstances will we compromise our rights, cede our land, or
relinquish our dignity. If this [peace] is not achieved, we are not
in a hurry; for Syria does not give into threats, pressures or
slanders." In that same speech, which marked Syrian aviation day,
he urged the Syrian air force to boost its "combat preparedness."
On Oct. 17, the government-controlled Tishrin newspaper said the
Israeli plan for a unilateral withdrawal from Southern Lebanon was
"blackmail against Beirut and Damascus because the Israelis are not
serious [in their pullback proposals]."
Another indication that the talks need to get moving soon - while
at the same time tension builds - is a report from the United Arab
Emirates' al-Bayan. The Oct. 16 report said that Israel would
prepare to launch a strike against Syria if negotiation progress
was not achieved by April 2000. Citing Jordanian sources, the
paper reported that this preemptive strike would aim to eliminate
Syrian threats from Lebanon and to degrade or destroy Syria's
surface-to-surface missile capability.
Along with these security tensions, domestic political constraints
are slowing the process. Until Barak can get concrete security and
water guarantees from Syria enforceable through a neutral third
party, the negotiations are likely to remain stalled. Adding to the
problem is that the Syrian foreign minister, who was the
contact point for the negotiations, is still recovering from a
heart problem and has only recently returned to Damascus.
These issues have made it extremely difficult for both sides to
continue pre-negotiation talks in Jordan
[ http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/commentary/m9909161906.htm ]. Even
though the Jordanian foreign minister's trip to Syria makes it
appear that there is still hope, both governments need to ensure
these issues don't scuttle the talks. Therefore, while both
countries have signaled that peace is just around the corner, the
combination of bad timing and interior political forces may
continue to bog down the negotiations.
The Lebanese daily al-Nahar Oct. 26 quoted "informed Syrian
sources" as saying that a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from
southern Lebanon could lead to glitches in the peace process. They
emphasized that Israel would not be able to contain Hezbollah after
a withdrawal, which would increase the likelihood of conflicts
along the Israeli border. This in turn might induce Israel to
follow through on earlier threats to strike at the Lebanese
infrastructure, which ultimately would cause Syria to call off the
peace process. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak promised Syria
that Israel would unilaterally pull out of southern Lebanon by July
2000 as a token of goodwill in his peace-making efforts.
Why would Syria warn Barak not to deliver his promise? The answer
lies in the increasingly delicate balance of power among Israel,
Syria, Lebanon and Iran. The balanced is threatened by Iran's
involvement in the region and the succession struggle inside Syria.
Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon will leave a power vacuum
in the region, which Israel wants Syria to fill. This would leave
Syria with the responsibility of curbing Hezbollah activity - a
major Israeli condition for furthering the peace process. The Oct.
26 statements made it clear that Syria, which would certainly like
to take charge in southern Lebanon, is unable to do so.
Syria is unable to take charge for two interrelated reasons. First,
Damascus cannot commit additional forces while there is potential
for a domestic move against Syrian President Hafez Assad and his
potential successors. Second, the faction challenging Assad for
power may be allied with Iran. It is even possible that Iran
instigated the Syrian power struggle in response to Assad's
decision to cut off aid to Hezbollah. Directly challenging
Hezbollah would only intensify Iranian support for opponents of
Assad.
Even now, Syria is finding it difficult to curb current Hezbollah
activity, since Iran is now directly supporting Hezbollah through
Beirut rather than Damascus. Further complicating the issue, Iran
may also be supplying the guerrillas via Syrian bases and ports
controlled by Assad's domestic opponents. Pressure from Lebanon's
major power broker, Syria, would not be effective in curtailing
Hezbollah activity.
We have noted that Iran could be a key influence in the Syrian
power struggle hampering the peace process
[ http://www.stratfor.com/meaf/specialreports/special16.htm ]. It is
becoming increasingly clear that any chance of an Israeli-Syrian
peace deal directly depends on Assad's ability to maintain control.
If Assad's hold is loosening due to failing health and the
succession issue, he will be particularly reluctant to draw any
additional internal opposition by going up against Hezbollah. Thus,
it is better for Assad if Israel maintains its current presence in
Lebanon.
Barak may be open to keeping troops in Lebanon for a while, but not
indefinitely. On Oct. 21, Israel's Haaretz newspaper reported that
Barak is "flexible" on the date of a pullback. Barak has also been
quoted in private conversations as saying he would not "jump off a
tower" if the withdrawal is delayed a few months. However, the
prime minister may already be searching for a solution. On Oct. 27,
U.S. CIA Director George Tenet made a secret visit to Israel and
discussed "the prevention of acts of terrorism and the Iranian
threat" with political and military leaders, Yediot Aharonot
reported.
If Barak proceeds with withdrawal, Damascus will face a choice
between committing troops to the region and confronting Hezbollah
or abandoning south Lebanon to the guerrillas. The former threatens
to weaken Assad domestically. The latter threatens to increase
Hezbollah's strength. This would have the effect of upping Israeli
counterattacks on the Lebanese infrastructure, which could damage
Syrian interests in the country. Syria hopes to convince Israel
that neither option benefits the peace process.
Bashar Assad may soon be appointed to a senior position, possibly
vice president, in the country's leadership, according to a Feb. 21
report in the Lebanese daily As-Safir, a major conduit of leaks
from the Syrian government. According to the report, cited in the
Israeli newspaper Haaretz, the anticipated government reshuffle
would be implemented within 10 days at most.
The report also stated that President Hafez Assad convened the
national leadership of the ruling Baath Party last week in order to
discuss the urgent need to develop and renew the administration in
Syria while continuing to fight corruption and flawed management -
two areas in which Bashar Assad has been active in recent years. If
appointed to a high government post, it is a clear indication that
Bashar will officially become heir to the Syrian presidency, but
more importantly it indicates that he is ready for the
responsibility.
This development also sheds light on a possible motivation for
Syria's negotiations with Israel. It is likely that President Assad
is using the current Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations to ensure
that the special relationship he has built with Israel is passed on
to his son. Israel and Syria have maintained informal peace for
decades now, and the Syrian president needs to assure that the
tacit relationship will be honored when his son takes over. Since
Bashar became the heir apparent, he and President Assad have been
clearing out opponents to Bashar that could potentially want to
take advantage of his perceived weakness.
Certain factions in Syria believe Bashar is too inexperienced to
handle the presidency, and since he was outside the political
intrigues of Damascus, they are undoubtedly correct - unless the
path can be smoothed for him. In 1994 Bashar was completing an
ophthalmology residency in Britain when his older brother and heir
apparent at the time, Basil, was killed in a car accident. Bashar
had reportedly said that he had never sought a life in politics nor
dreamed of becoming president. However, under pressure from his
father, he agreed to return to Syria and begin the process of
grooming for the leadership.
Upon his return to Syria in 1994, Bashar unsurprisingly moved
quickly up through the military and became a colonel in January
1999. He also commands a brigade of the elite Republican Guard
division. Toward the end of 1998, Bashar took charge of Syria's
Lebanon portfolio - an area of influence critically important to
Damascus. Lebanon's trade and smuggling routes provide a
significant amount of revenue to Damascus and by extension specific
families in Damascus. The importance of politics in Lebanon is
deeply personal in Damascus down to the level of families and
clans.
In order to remove potential obstacles to the chosen, if
inexperienced successor, Assad launched a series of purges focused
on two interrelated goals. Older guards who have established their
own power bases are being replaced with Bashar loyalists.
Concurrently, Bashar and Assad are removing those who could
challenge Bashar's ability to exercise authority and influence in
both Syria and Lebanon.
As it turns out, all the purges are deeply intertwined. They are
designed to clear the way for Bashar to rule effectively when he
rises to power. Assad is clearing out Bashar's foes, many of whom
are competitors with the Assad family for control of the lucrative
trade routes through Lebanon. Meanwhile, Assad is trying to reach
an agreement with Israel not to undermine Bashar.
In 1998 the former Intelligence Chief Bashir al-Najjar was removed
and later sentenced to prison on corruption and embezzlement
charges, and the chief of staff of the armed forces, Hikmat al-
Shihabi, known to be at odds with Bashar, was replaced with a
Bashar loyalist and fellow member of the secretive Shiite sect,
Alawi.
Rifaat Assad, the president's estranged brother and potential
Bashar challenger, has been reined in. Rifaat has presidential
ambitions for himself and his son and attempted a coup in 1984
while President Assad was ill. In an October 1999 attempt to
eliminate Rifaat's power base, Bashar's Republican Guard troops
attacked Rifaat's "illegal" Latakia port and residence, destroying
the compound and reportedly killing hundreds of Rifaat's loyalists.
A highly significant purge was the Feb. 6 retirement of the
military intelligence head Gen. Ali Duba. According to Agence
France-Presse in 1998, informed Arab diplomats reported that Duba
was "a major obstacle to Bashar's accession." Although Syrian army
officers frequently continue service beyond retirement age, Duba
questioned why a presidential successor needed to come from the
Assad clan. This would explain why President Assad and Bashar
mandated Duba's retirement.
Not only was Duba a threat to Bashar, he was also associated with
Lebanese smuggling. Duba was cited in February 1999 in a case
involving the illicit traffic of religious relics between Lebanon
and Canada, according to Intelligence Newsletter. An inquiry
revealed the existence of a network that had been operating since
1990 under Duba's protection. Duba's retirement was attributed to
his alleged involvement in this and other financial scandals.
The broad government purges may even go as high as the level of
prime minister. According to As-Safir, Prime Minister Mahmoud
Zoubi, who has held his post since 1987, is expected to be
replaced. One rumor is that Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa will be
made prime minister to be on par with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak in the Israeli-Syrian peace talks. Sharaa is a staunch
supporter of President Assad and will be equally loyal to Bashar.
In addition to government and military purges, President Assad has
also purged Syria and Lebanon of Islamic militants opposed to the
current negotiations with Israel.
The anticipated government reshuffle will secure Bashar's position
as the undisputed heir apparent. The high-level purges pave the way
for Bashar's security once he takes office. As president, Bashar's
more experienced rivals who remain in the Syrian government will
find it difficult to challenge him. President Assad is effectively
working to secure his son's and family's power in Syria and control
over Lebanon, while maintaining Syria's convenient, if tacit,
relationship with Israel. Since news does not freely flow out of
Syria, the fact As-Safir reported Bashar's readiness to rise a
notch in power means that the purges seem to be working.
Syria's ruler for the last 30 years, Hafez Assad, reportedly
suffered a stroke in early April according to a report by London's
Sunday Telegraph, citing Western diplomats in Damascus.
Importantly, Assad failed to make his customary address to the
nation on April 7 - the anniversary of the founding of his ruling
Baath party - and missed Independence Day celebrations 10 days
later, according to the report.
While Assad has been known to be ill for some months, the future
leadership of his country has been less clear. However, most signs
point to the ascendancy of his son Bashar. There have been no
reports of serious unrest directed at him in the last month,
suggesting that he has been successful in securing power from the
only serious rival, the president's brother, Rifaat. In contrast,
when Assad suffered a serious heart attack in 1983, Rifaat
attempted a military takeover of the government. Last fall,
however, his power base was seriously undercut when Republican
Guard troops attacked Rifaat's Latakia port and residence and
killed hundreds of Rifaat's loyalists.
The president took great pains to pave the path to power for his
son. His potential opponents appear to have been purged and the
cabinet was reshuffled last month. In the past two years, the
intelligence chief, the chief of staff of the armed forces, the
director of military intelligence and the prime minister have all
been removed and replaced with Bashar loyalists. Additionally, the
Jerusalem Post reported that the powerful Foreign Minister Farouk
Sharaa acknowledged on April 3 - right around the time of the
reported stroke - that Bashar was in line for succession.
Indeed, throughout the last month, Bashar has taken an
unprecedented and more prominent role in the country's affairs. On
April 27, he met an Israeli parliament member to discuss the peace
process - something he had never done before. He also warned Israel
on April 28 that a unilateral pullout from south Lebanon, without
prior agreement with Syria, could trigger instability. Bashar also
used his authority as the president's son to lobby for economic
reforms. From April 20 through April 27, Syria liberalized its
rules against holding foreign currency and narrowed the power of
economic security courts.
But at age 35, Bashar is nowhere near as experienced or savvy as
his father. Syrian politics is a delicate game of balancing various
internal factions off one another to maintain a firm grip on power
- occasionally involving the death of opponents to the regime.
Bashar undoubtedly lacks skill at this - or at least experience -
due to his late grooming for power following years spent outside of
Syria. Only six years ago, he was completing an ophthalmology
residency in Great Britain when his older brother was killed in a
car accident. Since his return home, he has moved through posts in
the military, become a colonel last year and recently commanded a
brigade of the elite Republican Guard division.
His inexperience will likely color his leadership. Bashar, for
example, has a reform agenda aimed at attracting foreign investment
to Syria's isolated economy. Damascus may begin to lean toward the
West as a result. Specifically, Syria is likely to shift its
alignment away from internationally isolated countries like Iraq,
even though the two have recently expanded ties. A recent decision
by Iraq indicates that this shift may already be under way.
According to a May 1 Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) report,
Iraq now prefers to repair an oil terminal in the Persian Gulf
rather than reopen a pipeline through Syria.
Also, Syria after Hafez Assad is likely to be more intransigent
toward peace negotiations with Israel. Bashar does not bear any
additional malice. He simply is not yet secure enough in his
position to make the necessary and costly concessions to Syria's
historic enemy without earning the enmity of hard-line factions in
Damascus.
Bashar will tread a careful, moderate path in all his actions - not
a Western interpretation of moderate but moderate in that he can
implement change more incrementally than boldly.
Syria's new president punctuated his anti-corruption drive July 23
by targeting two former Syrian ministers. Former deputy prime
minister for economic affairs Salim Yassin and former transport
minister Mufid Abdel Karim were charged with "abuse of power,
taking decisions harmful to the national economy and making
personal profits," according to the official Syrian Arab News
Agency (SANA). The arrest is the most significant step so far in
Assad's anti-corruption efforts - yet the trial is a carefully
crafted show. Bashar is making an example of these two, but if the
example does not generate voluntary compliance, real reform could
be a long time coming.
The two ex-ministers are being held in connection with an order for
six Airbus 320-As made for the state-owned Syrian Arab Airlines in
1996. An arrest warrant has also been issued for a third man, Munir
Abu Khaddur, who is on the run. SANA wrote that former Prime
Minister Mahmud al-Zohbi, who committed suicide in May, would also
have faced similar charges.
________________________________________________________________
Would you like to see full text?
http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/072500.ASP
___________________________________________________________________
The SANA report said Yassin and Karim had forced Syrian Air to buy
the Airbuses, most likely making a large profit on the side. The
crime is not noteworthy - corruption is almost expected in a
government partially based on medieval clan structures - but the
arrests certainly are. Despite concerns about his ability to govern
the nation, Bashar Assad has consistently emphasized economic
reform and anti-corruption. It appears that he wants to make an
example of these men.
The trial may have been Bashar's idea, but it derives from the
power of his late father, ex-president Hafez Assad, not his own.
The Airbus investigation began months ago and both men were
initially arrested in May - when the elder Assad was still alive.
Given Hafez's political sense and his ability to manipulate Syrian
political factions, it is likely that he had already addressed any
potential political backlash from the trial.
Bashar is playing this round with the deck stacked in his favor.
The question is whether Bashar can stack his own deck in the future
or if this is his only shot at convincing Syrians to change their
ways.
Bashar will use the trial to enhance his status as an economic
reformer in the hopes of luring foreign investment into Syria. His
country definitely needs the money. The population is growing
faster than the economy. And Syria's oilfields - which supply the
lion's share of official export earnings - are expected to run dry
in 10 years, according to the U.S. Department of Energy.
_______________________________________________________________
For more on Syria, see:
http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/countries/Syria/default.htm
__________________________________________________________________
But the trial also sends a message to Syria's elite - a signal that
the old ways of doing business are longer acceptable. But here lies
the danger. Syria is run by one man, one clan and one party but the
ruler does not have absolute control. The Alawite-dominated
Ba'athist party makes up only a tiny percentage of the primarily
Sunni population. The Alawites have a strong hand on the military
and the security services, but they do not run a totalitarian
state, preferring to bribe their opponents whenever possible. Real
economic reforms will negate one of Bashar's most useful tools for
maintaining control of the regime at the same time they threaten
his opponents' way of life.
Significant economic reforms will also force Bashar to examine the
military's business ties. The military appears to be supporting
Bashar at the moment - but that could change if Bashar goes after
their bank accounts.
Bashar can milk the current trial for all it is worth, hoping to
frighten the Syrian elite into constraining their activities. But
the question is what can he do next. He can press the advantage,
hoping to keep his opponents off-guard, and clean the entire
economy. More likely he will move in fits and starts, bribing
certain groups with smuggling rights while reforming certain
sectors - making economic reform a very slow, piecemeal process.