South Africa

On Jan. 8, South African Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota delivered the most obvious sign to date that his country would take a greater role in the region. Speaking to a small crowd of African National Congress supporters, he spoke of the desire "to make sure the continent is stable and peaceful" and told them not to be surprised if "the president sends us abroad or sends our forces abroad." Lekota said that if South Africa does dispatch troops, it would be "for the betterment of the continent."

Despite the lack of a firm commitment, the way seems to be clearing for a South African peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A growing consensus appears to be forming among the major African powers.

South African President Thabo Mbeki earlier sought closer ties with Nigeria, the dominant state in West Africa, and succeeded when Nigerian Vice President Atiku Abubakar announced the two nations were "partners" with "the same responsibilities to bring about peace." Despite its support for President Laurent Kabila of the DRC, Libya has moved increasingly closer to South Africa. Libya and South Africa announced June 13, 1999, that they share the same view concerning regional peace, with the removal of foreign troops as the keystone. Zimbabwe, a traditional rival to South Africa, also came out on May 31 as supportive of South African involvement in the DRC.

South Africa has several reasons for sending peacekeepers, beyond simple altruism. The DRC conflict involves more than just the rebels and the government. Ugandan and Rwandan troops back rebel forces, while soldiers from Zimbabwe and Angola support the government. Meanwhile, rebel UNITA forces fighting the Angolan government use the DRC for a staging ground. Currently, neither conflict threatens South Africa. But, as each nation attempts to enlarge its grasp on the DRC's resources, there is an increasing chance of a continent-wide conflagration. Ending the fighting in DRC constitutes the first step in stabilizing the politics of the region.

Stabilizing the region would do two things for South Africa. First, a stable political environment would help the region's economies. Second, South African involvement would secure its place as the regional power broker. South African firms, such as De Beers diamonds, already have a strong grasp on the region's resources. Military involvement would simply help stabilize the political chaos.

But a serious caveat remains. Regional hegemony is an extremely expensive business. Expeditionary warfare is only the first step. South Africa must be willing to devote the resources necessary to remain in the DRC and rebuild the country. This includes garrisoning troops, disarming the warring parties, forming and funding a new government, supporting the economy, feeding refugees, and repairing infrastructure. South Africa can't simply stop the fighting and leave; it has to rebuild the country or the conflict will resume.

South Africa is not economically strong enough to shoulder such a burden. Although its GDP dwarfs those of its neighbors, South Africa is doing all it can to solve its own problems. Plagued by unemployment, the economy has limped along at growth rates lower than 2 percent for the last three years. Approximately half of the population lives in poverty, and only 30 percent of the population has electricity, according to the consulting firm PRS Group.

Possibly, South Africa will appeal to the United Nations for financial assistance. For example, the Philippines offered to send troops to East Timor and the United Nations covered the expenses of doing so. However, the U.N. finances are in such poor shape that it hasn't been able to repay the peacekeeping expenses to members such as Britain, France and Germany. South Africa cannot afford to bet its economic future on the fiscal ability of the United Nations.

South Africa appears focused on solving the larger issue of sub- Saharan instability. This is an ambitious long-term goal, but rather risky for the near future. There is a small chance that we are observing the beginning of the stabilization of the African continent. However, it is more likely that South Africa will follow one of two courses. It could attempt a safe solution, such as contributing a small number of troops to a multinational force - without undertaking nation building. This would cost less but deliver nothing. Or it could overextend itself and find that its own house is collapsing at the same time it attempts to prop up a neighbor.