Somalia, Eritrea

Still, the U.S. may once again be prepared to offer the Taleban not only some form of recognition, but also economic incentives such as pipeline contracts. Formalizing relations with the Taleban would offer two potential benefits. Not only might the U.S. get bin Laden, but recognition might forestall the Taleban's Spring offensive. The U.S. would have a better chance -- if only slightly -- to moderate Taleban policies and mediate some form of government of national reconciliation if it recognizes the Taleban before they either conquer the remainder of Afghanistan or get deadlocked in a new round of intense warfare.

The Somali newspaper Mogadishu Times reported April 19 that Ethiopian troops have reached Bardaale in the Bay region of Somalia, northwest of Mogadishu. The newspaper charged that the Ethiopian forces had already seized many areas in the neighboring Gedo region, which borders Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia denied allegations earlier this month that it had sent heavily armed forces to intervene in factional fighting in Gedo region, and will no doubt deny this deeper incursion into Somalia. However, evidence suggests that the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea continues to spill over into neighboring states, intensifying local conflicts and threatening to destabilize the region.

Somali warlords Hussein Mohamed Aideed, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, and Omar Haji Mohamed "Masale" sent a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on April 11, charging that heavily armed Ethiopian forces had launched a series of attacks in Gedo region beginning April 8, and demanding that the UN Security Council take action against Addis Ababa. Copies of the letter were sent to the Arab League, the OAU, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The warlords alleged that Ethiopian forces had occupied the towns of Bulo Hawo and Dollo in Gedo region and had arrested local leaders.

Ethiopian government spokeswoman Selome Tadesse called the Somali allegations "unfounded" and an attempt by "devious forces" to portray Ethiopia as an invader. She said that Ethiopia had captured a group of Somalis on the 10th or 11th near Dollo as they attempted to smuggle large amounts of explosives from multiple countries of origin into Ethiopia. However the BBC, Agence France Presse, and the Indian Ocean Newsletter all reported that Ethiopian troops had intervened in the area on behalf of one faction in a power struggle within the Somali National Front -- the faction opposed to Omar Haji Mohamed and the Mogadishu warlords. Kenya has reportedly closed its border with Somalia in the region, and the Arab League has stated its concern with the Ethiopian Army's presence within Somalia, and announced that it would ask Addis Ababa to withdraw the troops.

Bulo Hawo is reportedly a stronghold of the fundamentalist rebel group Al-Ittihad Al-Islam, and Ethiopia has carried out attacks on the group several times in the past. Ethiopia's rebel Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which has allegedly received Libyan- funded arms shipments from Eritrea, is also reportedly active in Gedo region. As we reported April 7, both Ethiopia and Eritrea are arming competing factions in Somalia in a growing proxy war [http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/040799.asp]. In addition to the list of countercharges outlined in our last report, Ethiopia has alleged that Arab doctors are tending to wounded Eritrean officers at a clinic in southern Somalia controlled by Hussein Mohamed Aideed. Ethiopia also suggested that the recent kidnapping of three people in eastern Ethiopia was carried out by the Ogaden National Liberation Front, also allegedly supported by Eritrea via Aideed in Somalia. Aideed, in turn, claimed his militia killed three Somali agents of the Ethiopian government sent to Mogadishu to abduct Oromo rebel leaders. An official at Ethiopia's embassy in Nairobi denied Aideed's allegation, calling it "a continuation of the fabrications made by certain forces in Somalia who are explicitly supported by Eritrea."

While the spillover of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict into Somalia is apparently increasing, it is not the only potentially dangerous extension of that conflict. Sudan's foreign ministry on April 19 requested a postponement of peace talks with the opposition Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), scheduled to be held April 20-25 in Nairobi, under the auspices of the IGAD. Sudan has charged the SPLA with repeatedly violating a cease fire agreement. While it was Khartoum that called off the talks, the Ethiopian-Eritrean war is having a serious impact on the peace process. Ethiopia and Eritrea are both members of the IGAD, and both have actively supported and hosted the Sudanese opposition forces. The Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict has thrown regional alliances into a flux, disrupting the Sudanese opposition, while the conflict has also undermined Ethiopia and Eritrea's contribution to IGAD's attempt at negotiation.

Another emerging aspect of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict is its potential linkage with the question of allocation of the water of the Nile. Ethiopia is the source of three quarters of the Nile's waters, while Egypt and Sudan are the river's primary consumers. Both countries have historically been able to limit Ethiopia's control of Nile water, even leaving it out of agreements on division of the resource, and both have an interest in keeping Ethiopia weak. Ethiopian media has been increasingly raising this issue, suggesting that this might be the next area in which Ethiopia will be forced to defend its sovereignty. Egypt and Sudan also have interests in dominating the Red Sea, which might be possible with an Eritrean client state.

Ethiopia has alleged that Egypt is already supporting Eritrea with arms and expertise. Ethiopian newspapers have reported that light and medium arms and explosives captured from Eritrean forces were manufactured in Egypt and were payed for with Libyan or U.S. money or were donated by wealthy Egyptians. Egypt has claimed that has not armed Eritrea, and that the military equipment made its way to Eritrea through third parties. Other Eritrean reports claim that Egypt is providing Eritrea with military advise and intelligence through military experts masquerading as diplomats at Egypt's embassy in Asmara and Egyptian spies in Addis Ababa.

As the world's attention is riveted on the conflict in Yugoslavia, the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict is quietly spreading to involve a host of regional states and link a variety of preexisting and otherwise unconnected disputes. With the battle in the Democratic Republic of the Congo linking conflicts from Sudan to Angola, the spreading crisis in the Horn of Africa could contribute to a insoluble tangle of continent-wide conflict.

Addis Ababa's five-day offensive intensified on May 17, as Ethiopian units reportedly moved closer toward the strategic western town of Barentu, one of the Eritrean army's central supply centers and an important field headquarters. On Friday May 12, a renewed Ethiopian offensive broke through Eritrean lines at the disputed Mereb River border along the war's central front. Ethiopia is now moving to take towns along three of the country's main roads in an apparent attempt to gain control of Eritrea's strategic supply routes. At first glance, this offensive could threaten the Eritrean capital, Asmara,

However, it appears unlikely that advancing units are willing to capture Asmara. Instead, it seems that landlocked Ethiopia is attempting to divert the defenders in the hope of creating a breach in the southeastern front, at the town of Bure. By doing so, the Ethiopians would force defenders to focus on saving their capital. If the advancing forces succeed in this gambit, they could pour through the opening and seize the port at Assab - regaining access to the Red Sea and its trading routes. Facing both drought and famine, Ethiopia has strong incentive to capture the port in advance of any peace agreement.

When Eritrea declared independence from Ethiopia in 1993, it took the entire coastline, including both Red Sea ports - leaving Ethiopia landlocked. Although Ethiopia's government supported independence, conflicts soon arose between the two. They initially clashed over Ethiopia's access to Eritrea's two ports and inequitable trade. Though smaller, Eritrea held the upper hand over its larger neighbor. The government in Asmara kept the country's market effectively closed to Ethiopian goods, while Eritrean goods could freely enter neighboring Ethiopia.

___________________________________________________________________ Would you like to see full text and accompanying articles?

http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/051800.ASP
___________________________________________________________________

Border disputes erupted into war. Small unit skirmishes led to artillery duels, trench warfare and air strikes. By 1999, Ethiopia had succeeded in destroying both Eritrean Red Sea ports, at Assab and Massawa, disrupting re-supply. The conflict is now commonly viewed as a senseless nationalist struggle, when in fact the fighting is less about the rocky, barren border region and more about maritime access and trade. The reason that international efforts to mediate the dispute have failed is because they consistently focus on the less important issue of border disputes.

Amazingly, the balance of forces between these antagonists is closely matched. Ethiopia's population of 58 million dwarfs Eritrea's 4 million people. But the Ethiopian Army reportedly numbers about 350,000 - compared to Eritrea's 200,000 to 250,000 troops, according to Jane's Intelligence Review.

Forces engaged at the front are even more closely matched. Ethiopia fields 75,000 troops at the Mereb River, the central front, and Eritrea has deployed about 60,000 men and women, officials of the U.S. Central Command recently told Jane's Intelligence Review. Ethiopia does enjoy the advantage in the air - with 6 MiG-21s, 9 MiG-24s and 10 MiG-23s - while the Eritreans have just three combat effective MiG-29s. Three other Eritrean MiGs are apparently not operational. But in spite of their advantages, the Ethiopians have been unable to score a decisive win in the two-year-old war. Difficult terrain, trench warfare and Eritrea's stubbornly defensive strategy have all conspired against the Ethiopians.

The recent visit by a U.N. delegation led by U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke failed to reach a resolution, when the government in Eritrea refused to accept the terms of a proposed peace deal. Despite the two countries economic, cultural, linguistic and familial ties, neither side has been willing to compromise.

A redrawing of the lines on the ground, however, may force Eritrea to reconsider. Already Eritrea has had to pull forces from other areas in order to combat the Ethiopian military's advance, according to reports from U.N. officials. In advance of the country's worsening humanitarian crisis, Ethiopia has a short window of opportunity to try to seize the port at Assab and its trade - either by force or at the negotiating table.