Pakistan/India


Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee held a closed-door meeting with party leaders on June 28 to discuss, according to local press speculation, U.S. or Pakistani proposals for ending the current conflict in Kashmir. Little emerged from the meeting but a statement by Information Minister Pramod Mahajan that, "The parties supported the government's decision to evict armed intruders before resuming dialogue with Pakistan." U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Gibson Lanpher briefed officials in New Delhi on June 27 about talks he and U.S. Central Command commander in chief Marine General Anthony Zinni had held with Pakistani officials in Islamabad on June 24 and 25. However, both Lanpher and Indian officials denied reports that Lanpher had delivered a proposed peace plan to India, allowing safe passage for Pakistani-backed forces to retreat from Indian-controlled Kashmir. India's Foreign Ministry has confirmed reports that former Pakistani Foreign Secretary Niaz Naik traveled to New Delhi on Sunday on a secret mission from Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Pakistan denies Sharif sent any such envoy.

As Stratfor wrote on June 26, Prime Minister Sharif launched the Kashmir incursion for primarily domestic reasons. [http://www.stratfor.com/asia/specialreports/special15.htm] Sharif has wooed Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan to bolster his power -- pushing for Islamic Shariah law, backing the Taleban in Pakistan, and boosting support to Islamic separatists in Kashmir. But in strengthening the fundamentalists, Sharif has alienated the secular Pakistani military, which has not hesitated in the past to intervene in Pakistan's domestic politics. Sharif may also have given the fundamentalists too much leeway for his own security. With the Kashmir incursion, Sharif found the one thing that can keep both the military and the fundamentalists happily occupied. For the military, Indian occupied Kashmir is a security issue, threatening Islamabad. For the fundamentalists, Hindu Indian control of the predominantly Moslem state is an abomination. For Sharif, if the military and the fundamentalists are happy, he's happy -- and secure. The longer he can maintain the stalemate, the better.

Pakistan's Kashmir incursion has won it no points on the diplomatic front, with international opinion almost universally siding with India. Ministers of the Group of Eight leading industrial nations, as well as the governments of the U.S., Russia, France, Britain, and Germany, have all called on Pakistan to withdraw from the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kashmir. The U.S. has reportedly threatened to block the disbursement of $100 million in IMF aid if Pakistan does not withdraw. Pakistan's ally China has also refused to support the incursion, and Sharif returned from a planned six day visit to Beijing after only one day, citing the crisis in Kashmir for his abbreviated visit. As the Kashmir crisis did not keep Sharif from launching his trip, one can only assume that his departure was actually motivated by some other factor -- likely the firm reiteration by China that Pakistan should solve the crisis diplomatically and on its own.

While Sharif's international position is bad, his domestic position may be worse. As Stratfor previously reported, events may have moved out of Sharif's control. Sharif may be best served by a stalemate, but the factions he is attempting to keep in check are not, and may be moving unilaterally to break the Kashmir stalemate. Reports have emerged that the Pakistani intelligence service ISI is collaborating with separatist groups in India's Assam state, planning attacks on road and rail facilities to present New Delhi with a second front. In turn, separatist forces in Assam have reportedly been providing ISI with information on Indian troop movements in and toward Kashmir. Additionally, India's army claims that Pakistan has attempted to infiltrate an additional 600 to 800 guerrillas across the LoC, and that ISI is preparing to launch covert operations in Kashmir.

On June 26, Stratfor asked the question, "Can Sharif control the forces he has set in motion -- forces which he set in motion in an effort to mitigate the spiraling effects of his previous machinations?" Stratfor noted that, if his attempt to control both the Pakistani military and Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalists fails, Sharif's only option short of succumbing to chaos maybe to throw his full support to just one of the factions. If reports that Sharif sent Niaz Naik to New Delhi as his personal envoy prove true, then it appears that Sharif has made his choice.

Naik is a retired senior diplomat with a history of ties to Pakistan's military. He served, first as Pakistan's permanent representative to the UN and then as foreign secretary, under then President, General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. Naik was foreign secretary from 1982 to 1989, during the height of U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation in the face of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, making him a bridge not only to Pakistan's military but also to Washington. Naik later served as India's ambassador to India under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, though she was reportedly forced to remove him under pressure from Islamic fundamentalist factions, on the grounds that he served alcohol at official functions in India. Naik later chaired the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, and has continued to visit India frequently as part of a private think tank of academics and retired bureaucrats.

If Sharif has turned to Naik, following General Zinni's visit to Islamabad, it would suggest that he has decided that he can no longer balance Pakistan's factions and has thrown his support to the country's secular military -- evidently with U.S. backing. While this could ultimately prove to be a stabilizing force in the region, in the short term it risks a response from Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalists. Sharif has strengthened the fundamentalists at the military's expense, and now he may have to rely on the military to contain that force -- and preserve his government.

Pakistani army chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf announced Oct. 17 that the Pakistani military would unilaterally "de-escalate" the border with India by withdrawing "all forces moved to the borders in the recent past." This unexpected decision went a long way toward alleviating the growing international concern and condemnation over the military coup. However, Musharraf must also move to satisfy the powerful fundamentalist elements within Pakistan. His solution to this paradox may be an outward engagement with the West, combined with quiet support for Muslim militants.

Musharraf's decision to withdraw troops from the Indian border was described by some observers as a "diplomatic coup." The move alleviated international concern that his government would be militarily aggressive, placing Pakistan in the role of peacemaker. As an added bonus, it probably caught the Indian government off guard.

Be that as it may, the decision carries more weight symbolically than militarily. The withdrawal will only be along the "international borders," not the contested Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir, and will affect only troops that have been moved to the area recently. Furthermore, the possibility of significant military confrontation along the international border is currently relatively low. This move is also easier for Pakistan to make than India, since India's border is threatened by numerous militant groups based in Pakistan. Pakistan faces no such concerns.

For all his efforts to distance himself from Nawaz Sharif, Musharraf must still respond to the same problems that plagued Sharif. If he appears to be pandering too much to the West he will be labeled a puppet by fundamentalist elements within Pakistan. Although Musharraf theoretically holds enough military power to suppress fundamentalist dissent, such a cure could prove to be more destabilizing than the disease, especially considering that the army has its own fundamentalist elements.

Another option for Musharraf's efforts to curry favor with the fundamentalists is to support a certain amount of militant activity. This would serve two purposes. First, it would appease the fundamentalist factions within Pakistan. In addition, it would keep a significant number of them busy. Encouraging guerrilla-style insurgency does not appear to be too much of an ideological stretch for Musharraf, considering he spent the beginning of his military career as a behind-the-lines commando. Furthermore, there are several unconfirmed reports that he has stressed the military utility of low-level warfare against a numerically superior opponent in the past.

The only caveat to this plan is that militant operations before the coup were evidently run by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. The rivalry between the ISI and the military appears to be greater than the normal institutional rivalry would warrant. The ISI appears to have played a large part in Sharif's efforts to fire Musharraf. The month before Sharif was ousted, the ISI had been steadily increasing its influence with Sharif, under the direction of Gen. Khawaja Ziauddin. These efforts became so intense that Ziauddin accompanied Sharif virtually everywhere and acted as his de facto second-in-command. It was apparently Sharif's appointment of Ziauddin to the position of army chief that triggered Musharraf's decision to take over the government.

With Ziauddin reportedly under guard, there is a question of whether the line ISI forces will cooperate with Musharraf. We don't think this will be a problem for the simple reason that Musharraf will be careful to appoint an ISI head who will be loyal to him. Furthermore, the ISI simply does not have the manpower or firepower to compete militarily with the army.

Musharraf may not even need to work with the ISI at all. Jane's Information reported that Musharraf spent much of the 1980s training the Afghan mujahedeen in its war against the Soviets. During that time he established contacts with several fundamentalist groups, such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat ul Ansar, both of which reportedly support Muslim guerrillas in Kashmir. It is possible that Musharraf has his own network of militants apart from the ISI.

Musharraf's position is much stronger than Sharif's was, but he is by no means omnipotent. Musharraf is obviously supported by the military, but he must still please both an international constituency and a domestic constituency with opposing agendas. A good way for him to do so is by publicly advocating a non- aggressive foreign policy, while quietly encouraging small-scale insurgency.

Indian troops on the Arunachal Pradesh section, in the extreme northern section of the India-China border, went on maximum alert Nov. 7, in response to China's increased "activities," according to an Indian army commander speaking to the Press Trust of India (PTI) . Lt. Gen. D.B. Shekatkar attributed the increased vigilance to China's construction of a road on its own side of the border and incursions into territory that India considers its own.

The move further burdens the already overextended 1.1 million man Indian Army, and may soon force it into a concerted effort to resolve one or more of its burdensome commitments. Several situations have recently stretched military resources. In the weeks since the Pakistani coup, the army has strengthened security along the Pakistani border. Units stationed in Kashmir have remained on high alert, particularly since militants stormed a headquarters in Srinagar Nov. 4, killing seven personnel.

Indeed, if India had more forces available to guard Srinagar, the raid might not have been such a deadly surprise. Finally, recent cyclones in the southeast have tied up still more troops, who now work to calm starving mobs and distribute aid in the region.

Even before the recent announcement, India intensified its watch on the northern border between the state of Assam and the neighboring kingdom of Bhutan. Members of the separatist United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), a group that has fought for Assam's independence since 1979, have been in hiding in Bhutan and have reportedly been preparing to shift operations back into India. Since 1979, more than 10,000 have been killed in conflicts with ULFA. [ http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/GIU/121698.ASP ] In addition to battling ULFA, the military has been tied down by other separatist movements in the state.

Very recently, an overstretched military has tempted the country's many separatist movements. At the peak of the Kashmir conflict in June, for example, the army had to pull troops out of Kashmir to counter increased threats from Pakistan to the Indian state of Gujarat. In turn, troops withdrew from Assam to deploy into Kashmir. The Assam separatists seized the opportunity to launch greater attacks on infrastructure targets, bombing highways and railroads. [ http://www.stratfor.com/asia/specialreports/special45.htm ]

In the hope of avoiding a similar situation, India will seek to eliminate - or at least ease - the problem it can most quickly solve. And it is likely to act quickly, before opponents can take advantage of the army's predicament. The country's separatist movements, after all, are more than mere internal disputes; arch- enemy Pakistan actively supports separatists in both Assam and Kashmir.

Because it has little hope of quickly resolving the 52-year old struggle over Kashmir, India has two far more feasible options. It can step up its ongoing diplomatic initiatives toward Beijing to keep its northern border with China secure. Or New Delhi can launch a pre-emptive strike on the most vulnerable separatist: ULFA militants who are reportedly planning to move from Bhutan into India. This could then further the military's goals, allowing a broader and more decisive campaign against all separatists in Assam.

Conversely, the new alert status is unlikely to lead to border skirmishes with the Chinese. Shekatkar, the army commander in the area, made several comments to the PTI suggesting the situation remained relatively low-key, despite the alert. He specifically stated that the problem would not escalate into a "Kargil-type" conflict, and even excused the Chinese violation of the Line of Control by saying the incidents were "bound to take place as there was no demarcated actual Line of Control." He later said that top army officials of the two countries hold at least monthly border meetings to defuse tension and solve problems.

More broadly, India appears interested in strengthening relations with China. Recent events are overriding traditional antagonism. Hoping to gain Chinese support during the Kargil conflict in June, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh told Beijing's foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan, that India did not consider his country a threat. Afterwards, Tang said Sino-Indian relations had "entered a phase of improvement." Most recently, President K.R. Narayanan told the parliament Oct. 25 that India should continue its dialogue with China to improve and broaden relations. But over the long run, improved relations with China, are likely to take time and could be difficult to maintain.

India needs a quicker fix, and may find it in a strike to quash ULFA militants in Assam. Recent attempts at negotiations with the group have been fruitless. Its leaders recently spurned an offer of safe passage; it is possible that the offer was in fact a set-up. Now the military will have both good reason and timing for a strike. ULFA members hiding in the Bhutanese jungles reportedly plan to shift their bases back into India. Indian forces have been trying to catch members sneaking back not merely into Assam but also into the states of Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh. India can attack them while they are the most vulnerable - while they are in transit.

U.S. President Bill Clinton is traveling to India, Bangladesh and Pakistan March 19-25. It will be the first visit of a U.S. president to India in 22 years - and the most extensive ever. Characterizing the visit, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said Clinton "will seek to begin a new chapter in [U.S.] relations." But the mission will likely yield little; the countries' positions and goals differ greatly, and they both bestow different levels of importance to the visit.

Relations between the United States and India, strained throughout the Cold War, have improved little following the collapse of the Soviet Union. India, a key member of the non-aligned movement, later signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Relations with Washington remained strained as India took on the role of spokesman for developing nations, chiding Western nations for perpetuating economic colonialism.

Washington perceives India as fundamentally little more than a developing nation - albeit a very large one. It continues to view India as a prize to be won in order to counter the similar competing interests of Russia and China. Thus in talks and negotiations, the United States accords India a lower status than when dealing with nations like China or Russia.

India, however, has clearly shown it wishes to be treated as equal to other regional powers; it has shunned advances from China and maintained a distance from Russia.

This fundamental difference underlies and hinders Washington-New Delhi relations. Clinton's visit represents one of a great power to a minor nation. The U.S. agenda includes opening India's telecom markets to U.S. businesses, obtaining India's pledge to end nuclear testing and bringing stability to the Kashmir region. India views the talks as an opportunity to garner greater U.S. investment, easier access for Indian workers to the United States and the respect due a growing regional power.

Isolated by deserts and mountains, India is nonetheless militarily and economically well positioned, straddling the sea route between the Middle East and Asia. India now asserts its independence after years of being constrained by Cold War animosities among China, Russia and the United States.

New Delhi has already shown clear resolve to reject treatment as a pawn in the multi-player game. India's nuclear tests in 1998, which strained relations with Washington, broadcast India's importance to the world, as well as to Pakistan. Despite this, the United States continues to treat India as a lesser priority to China.

U.S. imports from India in 1998 amounted to less than 12 percent of those from China, according to U.S. trade data. Exports to India amounted to just 25 percent of those to China. Further, U.S. foreign direct investment to India in the financial year to March 1999 was barely 12 percent of that invested in China, according to an Indo-American Chamber of Commerce official cited by Agence France Presse. For India, as one of the world's largest democratic nations, it is an insult that Washington apparently has a greater interest in relations with communist China.

Clinton's visit to India will likely be frustrating and disappointing, accentuating the apparent friendliness of Pakistan during his brief stopover. Already claiming Clinton's Pakistan visit as a victory over India, Islamabad will willingly discuss Kashmir with Washington.

It is yet to be seen whether India will succeed in its goals to be treated as an equal among Asia's powers. However, New Delhi's determination to assert its status will clash with Washington's moves to recruit India as a subordinate South Asian ally. Clinton's visit will likely accomplish little, considering the widely differing perceptions of its importance.

During a recent Indian Naval Commanders' Conference, the Naval Operations Directorate announced plans for unilateral Indian navy exercises in the South China Sea later this year, according to government sources cited in the Hindustan Times April 24. The announcement comes amid debate within India's armed forces over the future role of the navy, including plans to increase its aircraft carrier force to three.

The decision to extend the reach and operational areas of India's expanding navy firmly into the South China Sea will not only trigger a reassessment of the balance of naval power in the region, but also risks a deterioration of Beijing-New Delhi relations as India encroaches into territory claimed by China.

India's navy intends to hold bilateral exercises with South Korea and Vietnam in October and November 2000. Following these exercises, four or five Indian vessels will remain in the South China Sea to be joined by an Indian Kilo-class submarine and reconnaissance aircraft for unilateral naval exercises.

The exercises fit within India's shifting definition of its naval areas of concern, as laid out by Defense Minister George Fernandes April 14 at the launching of India's latest warship the INS Brahmaputra. Fernandes said India's "area of interest extends from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea." The debate in New Delhi over the role of India's navy is apparently being won by those who wish to expand the operational capabilities of the navy and to increase attention to force projection and expeditionary forces.

India's spreading naval reach is in part to counter the growing threat of piracy on both sides of the Strait of Malacca. In November 1999, Indian navy and coast guard vessels recaptured a hijacked Japanese cargo ship after a 12-hour chase. The hijacking prompted Japan to consider increased financial and possibly naval support to patrol the areas around the Strait in cooperation with China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. This in turn contributed to Fernandes calling Japan and Vietnam key strategic partners in anti-piracy operations.

However, while India-Japan ties remain constrained by Tokyo's ongoing attempts to mediate between India and Pakistan, ties with Vietnam have been improving since a 1994 visit of then Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to Hanoi and the signing of a defense cooperation agreement. More recently, India has re-embarked on a "Look East" policy, increasing military and economic cooperation with Vietnam and enhancing ties with other South East Asian nations, including Myanmar.

At the same time India is expanding its naval reach into the South China Sea, it is expanding its force structure as well. The 2000-2001 defense budget includes $940 million for the Navy, up from $835 million the previous year. Of this, 60 percent has been allotted to acquisition of weapons and modernization programs.

While India's single operational aircraft carrier, the INS Viraat, is under refit, there are plans to build a domestic carrier and acquire the re-fit Russian Kiev-class Admiral Gorshkov. Prior to the recent launch of the INS Brahmaputra, India also commissioned its third fleet tanker, adding to its blue-water capabilities. There are plans to launch six more warships in 2000. India's naval expansion also includes buying several Russian MiG-29 Ks to add to its naval air force.

India is also preparing to launch a Kilo-class submarine capable of ballistic missile launches, according to the Hindu. On April 10, India tested the Dhanush ship-launched ballistic missile, and there are plans to fit some of India's Kilo-class submarines with Russian Klub-class ballistic missiles.

The expanding navy presents a direct challenge to China. Beijing and New Delhi are already competing for control over the Andaman Sea, along the west coast of Myanmar leading to the entrance of the Strait of Malacca. On land, the border between China and India remains contested in two areas, and China's traditional backing of Pakistan continues to hinder the potential for improved relations.

The move to expand operations from the north of the Arabian Sea through the South China Sea and to establish an expeditionary- capable force not only threatens China's areas of operation but also alters the balance of naval power in the region. Further, plans for three operation carriers will make India equal to the United Kingdom and second only to the United States in carrier assets. Regionally, other carrier-capable navies have just one, including Russia and Thailand.

Currently in the Pacific, West Pacific and Indian Ocean, the only viable expeditionary naval force is the United States. While Japan has significant naval forces, it will be some time before it is capable of extensive expeditionary activities. In creating a viable blue-water reach, including refueling and support craft, India will significantly surpass China's naval capabilities as well.

For China, the threat of an encroaching Indian naval presence will further undermine any potential Sino-Indian reconciliation and cooperation. An India capable of placing a carrier force off Chinese shore - supported by submarines capable of ballistic missile launches - drastically changes the equation with regard to China's support for India's rival Pakistan. With Russia supplying much of the technology and hardware, Sino-Russian relations will also be strained.

India's plans stem from several sources - counter-piracy, protection of trade routes, balancing China and establishing itself as a world power rather than simply a regional power. China has two choices: tie down Indian defense spending on land-based assets by instigating tensions with Pakistan or, more costly, match India's naval expansion with its own.

China will likely follow both paths, increasing its own naval reach in the short term by focusing on the establishment and maintenance of forward bases in the Spratly Islands and Myanmar. As India pushes to redefine itself as an international naval power, friction and confrontation with China will become more volatile.