Nigeria
Violence erupted on July 18 between members of the Yoruba and
Hausa ethnic groups in the southern Nigerian town of Shagamu and
carried on into the following day. At least 66 people were
killed in the town, which lies some 40 kilometers north of Lagos.
And while a tense peace has emerged at the urging of local
leaders -- and with the arrival of a Mobile Police Force
detachment -- Hausas fearful of Yoruba retaliation reportedly
flooded out of the town on July 19 and have not yet returned.
The Shagamu violence follows clashes between three other ethnic
groups -- Itsekiri, the Urhobo, and Ijaw -- over the spoils of
local government in the oil town of Warri on the eve of newly
elected President Olusegun Obasanjo's inauguration in late May,
which left at least 100 people dead.
International acclaim for the recent democratic transition in
Nigeria has overshadowed the primary, fundamental, and ongoing
problem facing President Obasanjo. Nigeria's political problems
stem from competition between the country's estimated 250 ethnic
groups, and particularly between the two largest groups, the
Hausa in the north and the Yoruba in the south. Obasanjo was
tapped for the presidency by a group of northern military leaders
for two reasons. One was to polish up Nigeria's international
reputation with at least a reasonable facsimile of democratically
elected civilian government. The other was, if not to bridge the
gap between the competing ethnic groups, then at least to blunt
ethnic unrest.
Obasanjo succeeded in the first task. Obasanjo, who led
Nigeria's military government from 1976-1979 following the
assassination of General Murtala Muhammad, was the first Nigerian
military leader to voluntarily hand over power to a
democratically elected civilian government. Until his own
inauguration, he was also the only military leader to do so.
When last in power, Obasanjo built an international reputation
for his foreign policy, which was critical of the white minority
governments in South Africa and Zimbabwe. After stepping down,
and thereby boosting his international credentials, Obasanjo
remained in the public eye, sitting on international commissions,
running for UN Secretary General, and criticizing subsequent
Nigerian military regimes. Obasanjo was sentenced to life in
prison under former military leader General Sani Abacha for
allegedly plotting a coup attempt, though his sentence was
shortened due to international pressure and he was released
following Abacha's death last year.
Obasanjo's first two months in office have seen him acting the
statesman. He has attended the Organization of African Unity
Summit in Algiers and visited countries all over Africa. He has
also been keen to put himself in the forefront of international
efforts to end the region's various wars. All told, Obasanjo was
the most politically viable and acceptable candidate, and when
Nigeria's military leaders relinquished power to him, they
succeeded in mending Nigeria's image -- for the time being.
Success on the second count is not so clear. Obasanjo was backed
by a cabal of northern Nigerian interests, including former
Nigerian leader General Ibrahim Babangida, in large part because
Obasanjo was a pro-northern Yoruba. It was hoped that, through a
Yoruba president with a Hausa power base, the Hausa could
effectively maintain power while pacifying the Yoruba. The
Yoruba had lost their political leader, Moshood Abiola, to an
apparent -- if curiously timed -- heart attack almost immediately
after the death of General Sani Abacha.
However, Obasanjo has been criticized even in his own home
district as being a puppet of the military. The make-up of his
cabinet does little to undermine this notion as it is filled with
people who have, at various times in the past, served in the
military governments that have largely dominated Nigeria for the
last 30 years. And while mistrusted by the Yoruba, Obasanjo is
also mistrusted by the Hausa, who are unsure of just how devoted
he is to their interests. According to media sources, there is a
growing fear among the Hausa that they may face repercussions
under their new Yoruba president for the past 15 years of Hausa
politico-military dominance.
The violence in Shagamu is the first real test of Obasanjo's
ability to bridge the ethnic gap. As of July 20 the situation
appears to be stable, with minimum government intervention. A
curfew has been established, a Mobile Police Force detachment has
been sent into the area, and an investigation is underway. The
Shagamu clash thus far appears to be an isolated incident, and to
be under control. The underlying issues have not gone away,
however, and Obasanjo's moderate response may not be as effective
should the unrest spread or recur in Shagamu.
Obasanjo is essentially faced with two choices when it comes to
ethnic violence. He can attempt to protect his carefully crafted
international and domestic image as a democrat and act benignly
toward outbreaks of violence. Or he can crack down on freedoms
in an effort to suppress the violent ethnic competition. This is
how military governments in Nigeria dealt with ethnic tension for
30 years -- albeit to the detriment of their international
reputation.
For now, Obasanjo is primarily interested in the international
game, and is hoping that a mild hand, his image as a peacemaker,
and deep divisions among the Yoruba will suffice to control
outbreaks of violence such as those in Warri and Shagamu. This
remains to be seen. There have been calls for retribution,
particularly from the Yoruba, but leaders of both groups are
attempting to quiet things down. If, however, there is a spiral
of violence and revenge, Obasanjo may be forced to crack down --
or have the military do it for him.
In his first few months in power, Nigerian President Olesegun
Obasanjo appeared to be making all the moves expected of a new
president. He purged the military of 93 high-level officers for
involvement in political activities, meaning they held positions of
power and influence in the Sani Abacha regime, and he appointed
ministers who had experience in past military regimes. His key
petroleum "advisor," Rilwanu Lukman, was foreign minister in
Ibrahim Babangida's military regime and Defense Minister Theophilus
Danjuma was chief of staff of the army during Obasanjo's own tenure
as military ruler from 1976-1979.
Since taking these steps, however, Obasanjo has begun testing the
limits of his civilian government. First, on August 18, Defense
Minister Danjuma announced that the Nigerian military would be cut
from 80,000 to 50,000 troops over the next few months. At the time,
the excuse for taking such drastic measures was the need to
professionalize and upgrade the military by cutting the fat. A
report in London's Daily Telegraph quotes a Nigerian government
source as saying the real aim of the cuts was to protect future
governments from the threat of a military coup. That said, it would
have been impossible for Obasanjo to make the decision on his own.
No single force in Nigerian politics can protect him from military
retribution though Obasanjo does enjoy some military support,
particularly among former military dictator Babangida's clique.
Signs that the military may have disagreed with the cuts emerged on
August 24. The president said in a nationally televised address
that his goal was to "redefine" the role of the army and that the
cuts announced by Danjuma were not set in stone. With this in mind,
it is possible that the announced cuts were merely a trial balloon
sent up to see how the military would react. Recent rumors about
Danjuma's mental health may have been designed to give Obasanjo
some cover in case there are serious signs of a backlash. It always
helps to have a "crazy man" around on whom you can blame seemingly
irrational acts.
Second, Obasanjo has taken some strong steps to limit the
military's involvement in the oil sector, a place where high-level
officers are believed to have enriched themselves in the past. The
Nigerian oil sector has traditionally been divided approximately
50-50 between foreign and domestic oil companies. Most of the
domestic companies have involved the use of front companies, widely
believed to be associated with military officers and friends of the
regime.
The same day Obasanjo announced the military cuts, the Nigerian
National Petroleum Company announced a restructuring of the
Nigerian oil sector, which exports 1.8 billion barrels-per-day
(bpd). The extraordinary thing about the restructuring was that
virtually all the contracts went to foreign oil companies rather
than Nigerian firms, reducing a traditional military stronghold.
Before the restructuring, the government laid down strict
conditions for the sector. Any company that sought a contract was
required to demonstrate substantial turnover, profits and a
willingness to invest in local communities. These were conditions
that the traditional front companies simply could not meet.
The other half of Nigeria's oil exports are carried out by six
large international oil consortia (Shell, Texaco, Mobil, Total,
Agip and Chevron). This group has come under increasing pressure
due to unrest in the oil-producing Niger Delta region. While the
area produces most of Nigeria's oil, it remains one of the nation's
poorest areas. Over the last several years, local tribes have
engaged in an increasingly violent campaign against the oil
companies. Heavy military deployments to the Niger Delta have been
unable to stem this violence, recently epitomized by sabotage,
kidnapping and the murder of foreign oil workers.
At a meeting on August 1 with NNPC Chairman Olaseki it was revealed
that unrest in the region had already cost Nigeria $1 billion in
oil revenue in 1999. Nigeria's oil revenues have dropped
precipitously since 1997, when it earned $15 billion. Obasanjo's
current budget, submitted in July, expects 1999 oil revenue to
amount to only $8 billion. Shell, Nigeria's largest single
producer, is currently operating at only 25% of its capacity of 1
million bpd and on August 17, Texaco announced that it was
suspending its 65,000 bpd operations due to community unrest. While
Nigeria was producing close to its OPEC quota in May its July
figures show a 70,000 bpd drop in production. These numbers are
expected to continue dropping for the next few months at least.
The establishment of a "truth commission" to uncover evidence of
human rights abuses by past military regimes is the third step
Obasanjo has taken to ruffling the feathers of former colleagues.
If experience in other countries is any indicator of what may
happen, Obasanjo may have difficulty controlling the commission.
The justice running the commission has a reputation for
independence and the commission has already received over 8,000
complaints against the military regime. Interestingly enough,
Obasanjo is in the unusual position of potentially being both a
defendant and a plaintiff to the commission. From 1976 to 1979, he
was the military ruler of Nigeria and from 1996 to 1998, he was a
political prisoner. However it shakes out, it is unlikely that the
military will appreciate having its dirty laundry aired in public,
even if the commission's powers of enforcement are less than clear.
To have undertaken such drastic steps against a military that has
run his country for the last three decades, Obasanjo must feel
protection from some area. We believe he is counting on two primary
factors. First, the oil sector. With the awarding of the new oil
contracts, it appears that Obasanjo is trying to encourage these
companies to invest in the region where they are located. One of
the direct causes of misery in the delta is that most of the money
appropriated for community development has gone straight into the
pockets of the military and other corrupt leaders. Obasanjo's moves
to link oil development to community development are an attempt to
win the "hearts and minds" of the local population and thereby
reduce the violence. An indication that the strategy may already be
paying dividends is the August 24 announcement that Shell has
reached an agreement with the government and local tribes to resume
operations in the delta.
The other major force Obasanjo is counting on for protection is the
international community. Obasanjo has long cultivated his personal
international ties. During his years out of power he was a major
player in the UN and was a front-runner to replace outgoing UN
Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar in 1991. He also has close ties
to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. His focus in the first two
months of office has seemingly been to improve Nigeria's foreign
relations. Obasanjo's jet-setting is not accidental. Nigeria will
be absolutely dependent on foreign aid and investment if it is ever
going to be able to make its oil industry pay for the development
of society as a whole. Obasanjo has succeeded brilliantly in his
efforts to line up potential investors during his first months in
office. This reserve would quickly dry up, however, if the military
or serious unrest undermined the government. The military may
realize this and is holding its hand in the interest of future
economic gains.
If this were not the case, we would expect a military coup in Abuja
within the next few weeks. There are no indications that this is
about to happen. Obasanjo is playing a dangerous game, betting
everything on economic success. So far, the military appears to be
willing to play along, accepting short-term losses in exchange for
Obasanjo's long-term promises. The same can be said of the oil
companies, which are Nigeria's key to economic success. By cutting
the military as he campaigns against corruption, Obasanjo is
clearly hoping to consolidate his power base during the current
window of opportunity. It remains to be seen how long his honeymoon
will last. If this policy does not begin to show success fairly
quickly, Obasanjo's house of cards may well collapse.
President Obasanjo has recently stepped up his campaign against the
corruption of the various military regimes that have ruled Nigeria
during the last 30 years. Most recently, the government announced
Oct. 6 the arrest of Mohammed Abacha, son of late military dictator
Sani Abacha. Obasanjo is apparently also proceeding with his
prosecution of Abacha's former security chief, Major Hamza al-
Mustapha - either oblivious to or unconcerned about possible
ramifications.
This lack of concern could be due to Obasanjo's confidence -
allowing him to attack a diverse group of former military rulers -
or it could betray desperation. The systematic nature of his
campaign, however, does not indicate desperation. In recent months,
Obasanjo has taken legal and economic steps against members of the
most recent military regimes. We do not see any particularly strong
factions capable of supporting Obasanjo against the others, which
raises the question of how he will survive this current bid for
increased power.
First, Obasanjo stepped up his campaign in August, announcing
significant cuts in the military and a clampdown on corrupt oil
concessions [ http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/GIU/082599.ASP ].
Since then, there have been a series of arrests culminating in that
of Abacha, Jr. Al-Mustapha was arrested on suspicion of murder
almost immediately after Obasanjo assumed office in June. The al-
Mustapha investigation has come uncomfortably close to the man who
willingly handed power to Obasanjo in May, Gen. Abdulsalami
Abubakar.
The allegations are slowly making their way to the top. Mustapha's
henchmen, Sgt. Barnabas Mcheila, "alias Rogers," has described how
a hit squad known as "Strike Force" worked under the Abacha regime
to do away with political opponents. This squad operated under the
direct control of al-Mustapha and was responsible for dozens of
assassinations and attempted assassinations. Al-Mustapha was also
reportedly involved in the murder of Sani Abacha, who - as the
current conventional wisdom in Nigeria holds - died of poison
rather than a heart attack.
Now the plot thickens. On Sept. 9, Gen. Jerry Useni, former
minister of the federal district under Abacha, was detained in
connection with Abacha's murder. He is the highest-ranking official
to be detained so far, although the allegations likely will
continue to climb. Abubakar admitted last year that Abacha had
planned to retire him and other members of his regime - but
conveniently died the day before.
As of yet, no formal charges have been leveled at Abubakar, though
Obasanjo is sending a clear message that the Abubakar faction is
not exempt from investigation. The first sign that the gloves were
coming off came Oct. 6, as the senate announced Abubakar might be
called to testify before the committee on drugs and narcotics. If
called, he will have to explain why he ordered the removal of the
national law enforcement agency from the ports prior to handing
power to Obasanjo.
In addition to these investigations, Obasanjo is going after the
wealth of former military rulers. In his speech before the U.N.
General Assembly Sept. 23, Obasanjo requested an international
convention or agreement to compel banks to repatriate funds to
countries from which they have been stolen. On Sept. 16, he ordered
24 senior military officers to return lands in Lagos state
illegally appropriated under former military regimes. Finally,
Abacha Jr.'s arrest stemmed from corruption charges alleging that
he and his family embezzled millions as part of a deal with then-
President Abubakar.
The opposition does not appear to be taking these steps lying down.
A new political group representing northern (Hausa-Faulani)
interests, the United Democratic Front, say their concerns are not
being properly addressed because of their constituency's ties with
past military regimes. The group has called on several former
leaders, including former heads of state Alhaji Shagari, Gen.
Mohammed Buhari, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida and Abubakar, for support.
Obasanjo seems to be taking notice: Several reports indicate that
security was beefed up at the Presidential Mansion on Oct. 5 -
prompting rumors of a coup attempt - although the government has
made moves to play down this possibility.
While it is clear who is against him, it is not clear who does
support Obasanjo. Popular support is unlikely. While his policies
have achieved much acclaim among the public at large and within the
international community, the president's recent actions have not
been accompanied by mass demonstrations in support of the
government. It is also unclear how international efforts could
protect Obasanjo.
A somewhat more convincing possibility is that Obasanjo is counting
on money from the oil sector to bolster his support. However, while
the oil situation has been improving, its growth is not spectacular
and there is still much to be done. A sudden economic windfall that
could be used to pay off allies is not in sight. Of course, given
the seriousness of current allegations, even cash might not be a
sufficient payoff.
Most interestingly, there could be two factions in the military.
Obasanjo's search for illegal foreign assets has studiously avoided
implicating Gen. Babangida, suggesting he may be behind Obasanjo.
In addition, the Pathfinder Group was founded recently, with the
express purpose of promoting Obasanjo's policies. The group is
headed by the minister of police and former adjutant general of the
army, retired Maj. Gen. David Jemibewon, who has long been
associated with pro-democracy factions within the military.
Obasanjo may be trying to rally military allies behind the scenes
or through the Pathfinder Group, but neither Jemibewon nor
Babangida have the power to protect Obasanjo should it come to out-
and-out confrontation with other factions in the military -
particularly those of Abacha and Abubakar.
None of these possibilities explain how Obasanjo is surviving these
maneuvers. He may in fact be playing a comparatively weak hand to
its fullest. Obasanjo is a seasoned political operator and these
moves have not been made recklessly. He has made it clear, however,
that no one in either the Abacha or Abubakar cliques can consider
themselves to be safe.
The announcement on October 5 that the Oputa Human Rights
Commission was extending its investigations to cover all abuses
from 1966 onwards serves notice to all other military rulers that
they are also subject to scrutiny. Further, Obasanjo can hold out
the possibility that various groups could escape the commission in
return for support against others - or at least non-interference.
This could hold potential enemies at bay.
Obasanjo is going after the Abacha and Abubakar cliques first
because they represent the greatest threat to his regime. Since
they held power most recently, more of their cronies remain in
positions of influence. Their abuses are also the most recent and
foremost in the public's imagination. Unless there is some shadowy
patron with considerable power - and we can find no likely
candidates - Obasanjo is playing a savvy political game designed to
keep his opponents as well as his allies off-balance while he
consolidates his hold on power.
The Nigerian air force (NAF), based on the eastern flank of the
Tactical Air Command in the cities of Yola and Maiduguri, was
placed on maximum alert Jan. 3, reported the Nigerian newspaper
Vanguard. The Nigerian army's armored division in Maiduguri was
also placed on alert. The National Security Council, headed by
Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, reportedly directed the
immediate reactivation and upgrading of the two NAF bases in Yola
and Maiduguri. According to the report, the bases, which house the
air force assault helicopter squadron, were ordered to be ready by
the end of the month.
Vanguard defense sources said that the alert followed Nigeria's
discovery that France was building a military base in Gagura, a
town in Cameroon located near the disputed peninsula border with
Nigeria. The Bakassi peninsula is a 400 square mile area that juts
out into the Gulf of Guinea and is rich in oil reserves. According
to the report, the French base is nearly completed and has
facilities for deploying military aircraft. Vanguard's sources said
the decision to build the base might be connected with Cameroon's
ambition to control the peninsula by any means. It is likely that
France - a strong ally since Cameroon's independence - has
interests in the peninsula's oil. Both countries lay claim to the
area, which has a Nigerian majority population.
The dispute over this peninsula dates back to the 19th century when
Western colonial powers divided Africa. Britain and Germany failed
to move the dividing line between what is now Nigeria and Cameroon
far enough out into the Gulf of Guinea, which left the Bakassi
peninsula in limbo. A 1913 agreement would have ceded Bakassi from
British-colonized Nigeria to the German protectorate of Kamerun,
but Britain and Germany went to war in 1914. After Germany's WWI
defeat, Cameroon was divided between the British and the French but
the peninsula issue remained unresolved. An agreement similar to
the one in 1913 was reportedly drawn up in 1975 as a reward to
Cameroon for its neutrality during the Nigerian civil war in
1967-70. However, Nigeria now claims that any such document is null
and void because it was never ratified before Nigerian authorities
were toppled in a 1975 military coup.
Since 1975, border tension has continued. Several bloody clashes
have left casualties on both sides, igniting public outrage.
Nigerian military authorities in 1993-94 often accused Cameroon
paramilitaries of burning down villages and displacing thousands of
ethnic Nigerians. Full armed conflict broke out in 1994, and
Cameroon brought a case before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in March of that year.
While the legal issue is tied up in the ICJ, the real issues are
beginning to emerge. France cooperates militarily with Cameroon.
The two have a defense agreement, and France continues to remain
active in Africa ( http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/111497.asp ).
It now appears that Paris also has oil interests in the peninsula
and is willing to protect them militarily. In July 1999, Africa
News reported that Nigerian soldiers had sent letters to their
government complaining about deplorable living conditions while
stationed on the peninsula. In these letters, the soldiers also
reported that some 30 oil rigs drilled on a daily basis between
East Atabong, a Nigerian camp, and Edima Abasi, where Cameroon
paramilitaries are stationed. The soldiers reported that the French
oil consortium ELF is responsible not only for the oil drilling,
but also for copious funding to maintain the Cameroon
paramilitaries.
If Cameroon, and by extension France, is eager to solve the dispute
militarily, Nigeria will likely oblige. After all, Abuja has not
fared well in the legal battle occurring in the ICJ. When Cameroon
took the case to the ICJ, Nigeria challenged the court's authority
to hear the case. The court ruled that it did have jurisdiction. In
November 1998, Nigeria then filed an appeal requesting an
interpretation of the judgment. The ICJ declared that request
"inadmissible" in March 1999. The international tribunal will
eventually come to a ruling based on legality and fairness, rather
than Nigerian and French oil interests. An ICJ solution is unlikely
to benefit any party involved, leaving military action the optimal
strategic solution.