Hungary
Hungarian radio, on April 11, reported that ethnic Hungarians
living in the Vojvodina autonomous province of Serbia are
becoming increasingly wary of an influx of armed Serbian refugees
fleeing NATO attacks in Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia. The
radio report went on to say that these refugees were organizing
themselves in some villages, stepping up their verbal attacks
toward ethnic Hungarians, and allegedly seizing and then dividing
up the Hungarian houses among themselves. Jozsef Kasza, chairman
of the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM), expressed his
concern over these developments, though he attempted to downplay
the situation, saying, "This danger is not so explicit at the
moment as to allow an atmosphere of panic to prevail in
Vojvodina." Still, reports of ethnic Hungarians being drafted
into the Serbian army have further increased tension in the
province, and Budapest has begun to express its concern about the
plight of Yugoslavia's ethnic Hungarians.
The situation in Vojvodina is not nearly a crisis -- nowhere near
the situation in Kosovo -- but the two are not unrelated. As
NATO searches for a resolution of the Kosovo crisis, two ideas
are emerging -- the possible partition of the province along
ethnic lines and the possible use of ground troops to force a
settlement. Both options threaten unsettling repercussions for
Vojvodina and Hungary.
First, there is the long term issue of discontiguous ethnic and
national boundaries in Europe. Yugoslavia's constituent
republics were wracked with civil wars when they attempted to
declare independence, as enclaves of ethnic Serbs attempted to
redraw the Balkan map such that Serbia's national boundaries
matched the region's ethnic distribution. NATO attempted to
block this process in Croatia and Bosnia, condemning it as
"ethnic cleansing" and declaring existing boundaries inviolable,
though it appears to be supporting ethnic Albanian self
determination in Kosovo.
For new NATO member Hungary, this issue hits close to home.
Major enclaves of ethnic Hungarians were left behind the newly
defined borders of neighboring Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia
following World War I. Hungary's desire for return of those
populations and regions was suppressed under the mantle of
socialist unity during the Cold War. And it was again forced to
abandon its claim to be protector of the rights of Hungarian
minorities in neighboring states in order to win entry into NATO.
NATO had no interest in inheriting the border disputes of new
members.
But now NATO is fighting for an enclave of a mistreated ethnic
minority in Serbia. It has toyed with the possibility of
matching national borders to ethnic distributions. And suddenly
the Serbs are getting belligerent toward the Vojvodina
Hungarians. Should the situation deteriorate in Vojvodina,
Hungary will be certain to seek a quick remedy. And if
Vojvodina, why not reopen the question of the Hungarian
minorities of Slovakia and Romania. Kosovo is rejuvenating a
long-term seething diplomatic problem that NATO had tried to get
Hungary to lay aside.
If the crisis in Kosovo soon ends in a diplomatic resolution,
then the Vojvodina issue may just revert to being a long-term
low-grade diplomatic irritant. But if NATO's bombing and the
UN's diplomacy does not soon cow Milosevic, then NATO will begin
to seriously consider a ground attack. That is not to say that
NATO will carry through with such an attack, but it must keep its
options open. One option for a ground attack is to strike from
the north -- from Hungary, through Vojvodina, to threaten
Belgrade. This route has an advantage over a thrust into Kosovo
as the Vojvodina terrain is open and flat, though marshy, and a
threat to Belgrade is a great deal more persuasive than a threat
to Prizren.
However, if Hungary begins to make an issue of the plight of the
Vojvodina Hungarians, neighboring Romania and Slovakia will balk
at what appears to be a NATO slicing off a chunk of Serbia for
the Hungarians like it appears to be doing for the Albanians. In
addition, Slovakia, which will have to agree to allow NATO troops
to pass through to Hungary in the event of a full-scale invasion
of Serbia, does not want to see any rectification in Hungary's
borders. This is not a Hungarian desire either Romania or
Slovakia will want to see satisfied. Now no one is saying that
NATO will attack Serbia on the ground at all, let alone through
Vojvodina, but the diplomatic struggle with Belgrade depends on
NATO appearing to have credible options. As NATO does not want
to fuel the territorial aspirations of its new member, nor to
alienate Romania and Slovakia, this option may be closing off.
On Nov. 20, Hungary's ambassador to NATO, Andra Simonyi said that
his country cannot afford to update its fleet of Soviet-era
fighters to meet the alliance's requirements for interoperability,
maintenance and logistical support. In an interview with the
Reuters news agency, Simonyi said that Hungary should meet its own
defense obligations before adapting its military for specialized
roles required by NATO planners.
His statement underscores a wider problem: turning NATO's three
newest members into true assets for the defense of Europe. They are
geographically exposed to the east and technologically out of step
with Western forces. Various types of munitions in Hungarian,
Polish and Czech forces don't match NATO's. Neither does the supply
chain of spare parts. Officers in the militaries of NATO's newest
members also lack adequate language training in English, the
alliance's working language.
The differences between the forces of NATO's original 16 members
and its newest three have only become more evident since the end of
the Kosovo conflict, and the resultant after-action reviews. Last
month, defense ministry officials in Budapest announced that they
would need five to eight years to meet NATO standards. On Oct. 29,
Brig. Gen. Lajos Erdelyi said that while inadequate equipment has
always plagued the 43,000-strong armed forces, the war against
Yugoslavia demonstrated just how inadequate much of it really is.
Hungary's public involvement in the conflict was limited to
allowing NATO jets to use two airports.
Hungary's immediate problems revolve around its fleet of 27 MiG-29
Fulcrum fighters. Though fine front line fighters, the jets still
use Soviet-style Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), making it
nearly impossible for alliance jets to positively identify them as
allied aircraft. On-board systems are limited compared to NATO
jets. And unlike most alliance combat aircraft, the Fulcrums cannot
refuel during flight, further limiting their use. Spare parts are
also scarce; the chief source would be a potentially undependable
supplier, Russia's Mikoyan.
Germany's DASA has offered to upgrade the MiGs. The German
Luftwaffe has had to upgrade its own Fulcrums, which were acquired
from the former East Germany. But Hungary probably cannot afford
such an extensive overhaul.
The chief problem, though, is not technical. It is ultimately
financial and political. NATO has expanded its borders eastward
with little consideration for the nature of those borders or local
forces. Indeed, Simonyi's statement suggests frustration. In
dealing with all three new members, the alliance has lent little
direct assistance to upgrade equipment. Instead, individual
countries must shoulder the financial and political burdens of
choosing new suppliers. But Hungary is at greater disadvantage than
either Poland or the Czech Republic. Hungary is simply poorer.
Expansion without adequate strategy is a luxury that the alliance
may not be able to afford for long. The post-Cold War interim
period is drawing to a close. Russia is becoming increasingly
belligerent - and that increasingly makes the militaries of Central
Europe nervous
[ http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/specialreports/special10.htm ]. But NATO
has remained in its post-Cold War role: not so much a bloc poised
to defend Europe as a quasi-military organization that also acts as
a gateway to Europe's economic clubs.
In accepting new members and rejecting others on this basis, NATO
has created two critical flaws. First, it has failed to create a
contiguous eastern front, mainly by choosing to exclude Slovakia
[ http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/010799.asp ]. The second flaw
is now painfully evident. The countries the alliance did include
are struggling to integrate their militaries with NATO forces and
will be delayed by years - in the best of scenarios
[ http://www.stratfor.com/cis/commentary/c9910021510.htm ].
Wittingly or not, Hungary is merely reminding the alliance that it
must either pay dearly to upgrade the militaries of Central Europe
or live with indefensible borders.