Germany

Fears that a resurgent Germany will become a dominant military force in Europe are misplaced. It is more likely Germany's military will shrink relative to its population and GDP. A position paper on the future of the German Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, authored by the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU), favored cutting the overall size of the force to 300,000 from its current level of almost 340,000. Support for the German military continues to wane among the German population as cuts in social spending are matched - or even exceeded - by cuts in military spending.

Germany is now set on a course where its defensively organized forces will rapidly lose military effectiveness and the capability for forward deployments. This will have serious implications for both NATO and any planned European Defense and Security Identity (EDSI). Most of all, it will complicate the security picture for Germany's eastern neighbors - particularly Poland and the Baltics - which are counting on the ability of the Bundeswehr to defend them from potential Russian threats.

Germany's politicians are having a tough time convincing voters to continue spending billions to modernize the German military while they make cuts in social benefits. The CDU leadership's proposal favoring military reduction reflects this popular sentiment. Now, all mainstream German political parties except the Christian Social Union (CSU) favor significant cuts in the size of the Bundeswehr. The Greens' recommendation is the most severe, calling for German armed forces of between 200,000 and 240,000 and an end to compulsory military service.

Since the end of the Cold War, it has become extremely difficult for Germany to justify defense outlays against obvious Russian weakness. Instead, Germans continued to emphasize commercial opportunities in Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe. This policy was even more eagerly embraced with the decreased Russian threat after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

To reassure the Russians and other neighbors after German reunification, German armed forces were cut to 350,000. In 1992, France - with two-thirds of Germany's GDP - surpassed Germany in defense spending. In 1999, France spent $15.8 billion more than Germany on its military.

The Social Democrat (SPD) and Green government that came into power in 1998 continued to focus on Germany's trade relations with the East. The Greens, many of whom led 1980s anti-NATO protests, are pacifist in nature and have always opposed the military. And while the SPD leadership is generally more hawkish, strong pacifist elements exist within the party ranks.

Current government plans call for a reduction in defense spending from its 1999 level of $23.5 billion to $21.5 billion by 2003. Even before this reduction, Germany spends - as a percentage of GDP - less on its military than Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic. While the opposition CDU proposal does envision higher defense spending - at $24.8 billion - than current government levels, it is still significantly lower than Germany's 1998 defense spending of $28.8 billion and half of what Germany spent as recently at 1992.

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, in January 2000, strongly criticized Germany for reducing its military forces. He said Germany set a bad example for new NATO members. In response, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping said it was difficult to spare defense spending while Germany's government was cutting programs across the board. In Germany, the Finance Ministry and not the Defense Ministry is dictating defense outlays - cuts that Scharping has been powerless to resist.

But Germany's eastern neighbors - particularly new NATO member Poland and NATO aspirants in the Baltic states - are looking to Germany to provide much of their defense capability. The loss of which leaves these countries in an uncomfortable position vis-a-vis the Russians. An improperly equipped 225,000-man German armed force will be hard-pressed to face a resurgent Russian threat - even if the political will could be summoned to forward-deploy German forces.

Poland and the Baltic states are left with two uncomfortable options: a rapid military build-up or a moderation of their policies toward Russia. Increasing their military forces is economically unviable and will certainly antagonize the Russians. A more conciliatory stance toward Russia will be needed until either Germany re-evaluates its military situation - a long-term hope - or it receives a major commitment from the United States - an unlikely event.

Countries hoping that Germany will take a military leadership role, particularly in Eastern Europe, will be disappointed. Instead, Germany will continue to pursue its policy of conciliation with Russia and will resist moves within Europe that may antagonize Moscow. In addition, Germany will have trouble meeting its obligations to any new European Security Force, whose leadership will then fall to the French or the British. While the French will be attracted to a militarily weak Germany, the additional military burden being placed on their own armed forces could be severe and this - more than any political considerations - could spell real trouble for the future of EDSI.

On April 5, Karl Lamers, the parliamentary foreign policy spokesman for the opposition Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), suggested in a parliamentary debate that Kosovo be partitioned. This broke a yearlong truce between government and opposition over Kosovo policy, eliciting immediate and heated objections that the option was irresponsible. The current German coalition has always been doubtful over NATO's goals and intentions in Kosovo, restrained only by a rigorous holding of the party line that the Kosovo campaign was a humanitarian intervention. But events in Kosovo and emerging evidence are undermining the government's position.

Kosovo is becoming an increasing burden on Germany both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the government lives in fear of a firefight between German soldiers and Albanians or Serbs. German casualties - or even worse, civilian casualties on the other side - will immediately cause an outcry and generate potential for serious splits within both governing parties. Both the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens have strong internal factions that are at best skeptical about German involvement.

Internationally, violence in Kosovo continues to fester, creating a source of ongoing concern as Germany attempts to maintain warm relations with Moscow. While Russia has always objected to Kosovo being split off from Serbia, an ongoing low-level crisis there also threatens to unhinge German efforts to keep the Cold War from setting in again. A quick exit at any cost - short of a complete undermining of NATO - may upset the Russians in the short term, but it offers Germany the possibility to put the issue behind it in its pursuit of constructive relations with Russia.
[http://www.stratfor.com/world/Commentaries/0003020245.htm]

In many ways, Germany has always been a fragile partner of the NATO coalition. During the Kosovo conflict last year, the Germans expressed alarm at the conflict's implications and worked diligently behind the scenes to strike a deal with the Russians that would end the operations and, by extension, limit German commitments. Germany's Greens, in particular, have reacted strongly to their leadership's support for NATO's operations, and it is by the slimmest of margins that Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has managed to keep a lid on dissent within his own party. [http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/commentary/c9904291507.htm]
[http://www.stratfor.com/world/Commentaries/0003090041.htm].

Other internal issues related to Kosovo include the fact that Germany harbors 180,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees, whose visas expired at the end of March. State interior ministers - particularly those in conservative states - have advocated the immediate return of these people to Kosovo. The expulsion of refugees - equal to 10 percent of the total Kosovar Albanian population - would undermine the Green position that the continuing operations in Kosovo are humanitarian in nature. Additionally, outbreaks of violence in Mitrovica and elsewhere are daily reminders of the considerable risk of German casualties and of last year's violence when German troops moved into Prizren and killed Serbs.

Up until recently, the German government - led by Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping and Fischer - has managed to maintain a shell of support for German operations in Kosovo. In late March 2000, however, retired German Brig. Gen. Heinz Loquai asserted in a new book that the Serbian "Horseshoe Plan" - a key element in solidifying German support for Operation Allied Force last year - was actually a creation of the German Defense Ministry.

While Scharping has vigorously denied this allegation, Loquai's assertion carries some weight. Particularly telling is his observation that the German government claimed the operation was named "Potkova" - the Croatian word for horseshoe - rather than "Potkovica" - the Serbian word. Scharping rebutted Loquai's statements by saying that details of the "Horseshoe Plan" came from the German Foreign Ministry, which obtained them either directly or indirectly from intelligence sources in Bulgaria.

The strident rebuttals of any and all criticism of the German government's Kosovo policy speaks to the fragility of the consensus it is trying to hold together. Fischer reacted swiftly April 5 to Lamers suggestion to partition Kosovo, characterizing it as an attempt to build a "mythology" surrounding NATO operations in Kosovo.

The weakness of the German government's position will not be able withstand a series of telling attacks from the opposition. Up until now they have been spared this through a tacit agreement between the government and the CDU/CSU. The conservative Christian Democrats (CDU), with a long history of NATO support, were quite willing to let this sensitive issue go unchallenged. However, the recent weakness of the CDU as a result of corruption scandals and leadership changes has led it to grasp at any issue that might undermine the government parties. Seen in this light, the government's Kosovo policy was an obvious target for criticism.

Germany is now entering a very difficult period in its foreign policy. Without destroying NATO, Germany will find it just as difficult to find an exit strategy for Kosovo as it was to build a consensus for following the U.S. lead last year. Partition - as suggested by the CDU - is an easy answer but it carries with it serious risks to other elements of German foreign policy.

Russia has always adamantly opposed splitting off Kosovo from Serbia - both as a consequence of its pro-Serbian position and from the risk of setting precedents in Russia. Germany, however, may also be calculating the ongoing risks and provocations that will anger Russia if German and NATO troops stay in Kosovo. German officials may have decided that removing the bandage quickly and risking short-term Russian anger is better than permitting the continuing risk of confrontations concerning Kosovo.

The German dilemma over Kosovo will only get worse. Continuing operations represent daily, serious risks for German foreign policy and even the survival of the government itself. With the opposition now signaling that Kosovo is fair game in the policy debates in Berlin, this pressure will only increase. Germany is already casting about for "safe" solutions to the problems in the Balkans. For example, Bodo Hombach, who is very close to German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, recently spearheaded an effort that raised $2.3 billion in aid for the Balkans.

Germany will not have the luxury of waiting for an economic revival to smooth relations in the Balkans. Instead, it will become an increasingly loud proponent of a quick NATO withdrawal from Kosovo, whatever the short-term costs. It is not likely that Germany will risk the cost of a unilateral withdrawal for fear of destroying NATO - although a reduction in the troop strength is a definite possibility. It will, however, make it clear in both Brussels and Washington that patience is limited when it comes to Kosovo.