Georgia
Georgian Radio reported May 25 that fifteen people, including
former senior state security officials and former high ranking
defense ministry officials with links to former Georgian Security
Chief Igor Giorgadze, had been arrested on charges of conspiracy
against the state. Giorgadze, now residing in Russia, stands
accused of having organized an attack against President
Shevardnadze on August 29 1995.
The Georgian news agency "Prime News," that same day, accused
Giorgadze and some of the suspects of holding recent meetings in
Moscow with Russian Armed Forces Intelligence Service (GRU)
employees. But the Russian Defense Ministry refuted these claims.
Also implicated in the plot was the leader of the United
Communist Party of Georgia, Panteleimon Giorgadze. The Georgian
Ministry of State Security said there is much evidence linking
the suspects to the plot, including the fact the conspirators had
already allocated the post of president and other high ranking
positions among themselves. No further details have been
released.
That Moscow would attempt to overthrow the current government of
Georgia by force is not particularly surprising. Political
intrigue is one of the cheapest means of confronting the growing
NATO influence in the Caucasus. Like several former Soviet
Republics, Georgia is turning to the West to guarantee its
security from what it considers an avaricious Russia. On
February 22, 1999, Shevardnadze announced his country would not
extend its membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States'
Collective Security Treaty. Incidentally, he justified this move
on the grounds that Russia had not delivered on Georgian requests
to extradite Giorgadze. Georgia has aligned itself with other
CIS republics that have opted out of the Security Treaty --
including Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Moldova, and Azerbaijan -- in the
semi-formal GUUAM organization. At the recent summit
commemorating NATO's 50th anniversary, the GUUAM members agreed
to cooperate militarily for regional security, strengthening
relations with NATO in the process. NATO and U.S. officials this
month announced plans to significantly increase relations with
Georgia.
Georgia's effort to extricate itself from Russian hegemony has
been complicated by the fact that Russian troops still remain
stationed inside of Georgia. Moscow also maintains the
responsibility of securing the peace militarily in the separatist
region of Abkhazia. Georgia views this peacekeeping mission as a
mixed blessing, because it strongly suspects Russian peacekeepers
in Abkhazia are supporting the separatists. Therefore, the
Georgians have been extremely fearful that Russia would play its
"Abkhazia card" should Georgia decide to cut its military ties to
Russia.
Nor is this the only danger that Georgia now faces. A look at
the map of the Caucasus reveals Moscow has another card to play.
Russia is aligned militarily with Georgia's neighbor Armenia.
Should Moscow step up its military backing of Yerevan, this
country could readily pose a military threat to both Georgia and
Azerbaijan. In response to these moves by Moscow, Tbilisi has to
build up its relations with Azerbaijan and Ukraine. In fact,
these three countries have already agreed to establish a common
peacekeeping force tasked to protect the transportation
infrastructure that carries oil from the Caspian region.
Specifically, they are cooperating to defend the new Baku to
Supsa pipeline, a route which competes with the Baku to
Novorossiysk (Russia) pipeline. In a broader sense, Georgia has
moved to step up its cooperation with Turkey, its NATO neighbor,
and with the U.S. As well, NATO is helping Georgia to build its
military, including its navy.
Even if this area were devoid of ethnic rivalries and hatreds,
which it is not, and even if the Russians were unwilling to risk
their remaining influence throughout this area by fomenting
national rivalries, which they are seemingly all to willing to
do, the fact remains that sooner or later the presence of
pipelines shipping oil from the land-locked Caspian Sea invites a
reawakening of Russian dreams. All in all then, a change of
government by "other means" would indeed be an inexpensive way
for Russia to deal with the strategic problems posed by an
increasingly belligerent Georgia. However, if true, this is a
very dangerous game that Russia and Georgia are both playing. If
the Georgian government can indeed prove that there is a Russian
connection to this attempted coup, it may turn what had been a
tense relationship between Tbilisi and Moscow into an open
confrontation. On the other hand, given the geopolitical cards
that Russia has to play, Georgia's government may be well advised
not to seek and then publicize the truth, and thereby avoid
inflaming public opinion before Georgia can be sure of NATO's
support in an ensuing confrontation.
The headquarters of the Republic of Georgia's State Border Guard
Department was evacuated Oct. 27 when what media described as an
"anti-personnel cluster land mine" was discovered in an office
previously occupied by Russian troops. The incident marred
ceremonies commemorating the withdrawal of Russian border guards
from the building, part of an overall withdrawal of Russian border
guards from Georgia. Georgian border guards commander Lt. Gen.
Valery Chkheidze charged that Russian officers refusing to accept
that Russia had lost another "colony," masterminded the incident.
But while Chkheidze framed the incident as a petty reprisal, the
mine incident and other Russian moves against Georgia are better
interpreted as a campaign to recover its lost colony. Russia's
departing gift was just a small example of the increasing pressure
Moscow is exerting on Tbilisi.
In Dagestan and Chechnya, Russia has finally set out to reverse its
national retreat. But Russia cannot regain lasting control of the
northern Caucasus without the cooperation of the southern Caucasus,
and Georgia and Azerbaijan have been anything but cooperative.
Moscow has accused both countries of assisting the Chechen rebels
by providing a conduit for the movement of people and supplies.
Georgia and Azerbaijan have also made clear their desire for
membership in Western European political, economic and military
organizations, including NATO. In an Oct. 25 interview with the
Financial Times, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze stated his
intention to "knock loudly on NATO's door" within five years.
Georgia and Azerbaijan are already members - along with Ukraine,
Uzbekistan and Moldova - of the decidedly pro-Western GUUAM group,
which has grown from an economic alliance to include security
cooperation.
Part of that cooperation is already evident in the joint force
established to defend the new Baku-Supsa pipeline from Azerbaijan
to the Black Sea coast of Georgia. The pipeline and plans for
others like it add to Russia's motivation to reassert its
influence. The explicit purpose of the Baku-Supsa pipeline and the
planned Baku-Ceyhan pipeline through Georgia to Turkey is to create
a route for oil from Central Asian countries outside the control of
Moscow - posing both an economic and strategic threat to Russia.
Therefore, in conjunction with its campaign in Chechnya, Russia has
begun to increase pressure on Georgia. This pressure currently
takes three main forms: threatening military intervention on
Georgia's border with Chechnya; backing Georgia's three separatist
regions, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Ajaria; and finally,
supporting the major Georgian opposition party.
First, Russia has explicitly warned Georgia to cease its support
for the separatist Chechen government and its armed forces. Russia
insisted that, if Georgia does not seal off the 80-km border it
shares with Chechnya, Russia will. In an Oct. 26 interview with
Moskovsky Komsomolets, Lt. Gen. Gennady Troshev, leader of Russian
troops in Chechnya, said Russia would "slam shut" the border in an
upcoming operation.
Moscow charges that not only has Georgia provided safe haven and
free transit for Chechens in the past, but that hundreds of Chechen
guerrillas have mingled with the refugees fleeing into Georgia and
are now massing in Georgian territory. Former Georgian Defense
Minister Tengiz Kitovani confirmed the Russian accusations,
claiming Oct. 27 that more than 450 armed Chechens were massing in
the village of Birkiani, in the Akhmeta district, near the border
with Dagestan.
Georgia's Border Guards Department vehemently denied the charges.
President Shevardnadze also denied that Georgia allows armed
Chechens to transit its territory, but refused to close the border
to refugees. If there is any truth to the Birkiani story, Georgia
could see a repeat of the Omalo incident, where Russian aircraft
"accidentally" bombed a Georgian village en-route to targets in
Dagestan.
On a second front, Russia is exploiting its influence in the
separatist regions of Georgia. In late September, Russia abrogated
a bilateral agreement and opened its border with the breakaway
region of Abkhazia, providing economic and military opportunities
for the region. [ http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/GIU/092899.ASP ]
Though it temporarily resealed the border in October, Russia
reopened it Oct. 26. Abkhazian leader Vladislav Ardzinba stated his
intention to ally with Russia against Georgia and its NATO
aspirations. Abkhazia has also reportedly begun taking over
facilities and equipment left behind by withdrawing Russian border
guards - items that technically should have become the property of
the Georgian border guard service.
South Ossetia has also demonstrated an affinity for Russia.
President Lyudvig Chibirov told Georgia's Prime-News on Oct. 25
that the region's government fully supported the Russian campaign
against "terrorists" in Chechnya. Chibirov said Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin is "on the right track." Chibirov called
Putin a "businesslike person," who would likely contribute to the
economic recovery of South Ossetia.
Russian border guards also reportedly left behind artillery in the
separatist region of Ajaria that has since been taken over by that
region's government. Ajaria has been Georgia's greatest bane
recently, withholding taxes from the federal government and
refusing to allow representatives of the ruling party into the
region. Ajarian police also reportedly confiscated and destroyed
ruling party campaign materials for the Oct. 31 parliamentary
election.
The third part of Russia's campaign in Georgia is concentrated on
the upcoming election. Shevardnadze alleged that Russia is
financing the opposition Union of Georgia's Democratic Revival,
which is headed by Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze. Abashidze is
widely seen as pro-Russian, and has supported the Abkhazian
government against the Georgian government. Shevardnadze describes
the opposition campaign as an attempt to stage a parliamentary coup
- not by force of arms, but by bribery, blackmail and threats. The
goal, argued Shevardnadze, is to take control of Parliament and
subsequently undermine and overthrow the president.
Shevardnadze's accusations are likely more than mere campaign
rhetoric: Moscow previously stated its intent to support pro-
Russian officials and candidates in the Ukrainian election. In
fact, the Russian military commander in the Ajarian capital of
Batumi, Maj. Gen. Vyacheslav Borisov, publicly declared that the
opposition Democratic Revival groups would not only win the
election, but would proceed to sign a treaty allowing Russia to
maintain bases in Georgia for 25-30 years. Georgian officials
condemned Borisov's statement as gross interference by Russia in
internal affairs and declared the general persona non grata in the
country.
Russia has Tbilisi in a difficult position. Georgia's separatist
regions are allying with Russia, the major opposition party is
Russian-backed and Russia has threatened a combat operation to seal
off Georgia's border with Chechnya. The assassination and hostage
crisis in Armenia Oct. 27 only intensifies this pressure. Russia's
main ally in the southern Caucasus, Armenia, is now politically
destabilized, and has already appealed to Russia for help. The
Russian Federal Security Service's elite Alpha commando unit was
deployed to Yerevan Oct. 28, and the pro-Russian Armenian military
has issued a public warning to the government that it will not
stand idly by while the country's security is threatened.
[ http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c9910282315.htm ]
In response to events in Chechnya and Armenia, Georgia's State
Border Guard Department announced Oct. 28 that it had doubled the
number of troops and mobilized all officers along the Armenian
border. And although Georgia has tightened control over its border
with Azerbaijan, the effort comes as too little, too late. Closing
off the Armenian border will not keep Russian influence out of
Georgia.
Russia has launched a full campaign to reassert control over the
southern Caucasus, and NATO is nowhere near riding to the rescue.
Armenia and Georgia are only a foretaste of Russia's strategy for
recovery of its lost empire. The campaign does not require Russian
armies to roll against its now independent former satellites.
Rather, Russia stands ready to bolster its allies in the region and
to exploit crises as they arise - or as they are created. The
strategy is in place in Georgia and Armenia. Azerbaijan can only be
next.
Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo and his Georgian
counterpart Kakha Targamadze announced Jan. 22 the beginning of
joint border operations - codenamed Undercover - to police the
Chechen-Georgian border, reported Russian Radio. If true, this
marks a significant policy shift for the Georgian government and
establishes a new Russian military presence in Georgia. The West
must react quickly or face losing Georgia as an ally in the
Caucasus.
At the beginning of the Chechen war, Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze steadfastly refused any Russian presence on the border
stating that Georgia was capable of monitoring it. This view has
incrementally changed over the past five months. A few weeks into
the Chechen campaign, in early November 1999, Georgia insisted that
in addition to monitoring the border, it would seal it. But
instead, in December, Russia dropped paratroopers at the most
accessible connection between Chechnya and Georgia, at the top of
the Argun Valley, and sealed it themselves. Georgia responded by
welcoming an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
monitoring group, hinting that Russians could join this effort.
Now, with a contentious CIS summit
[http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/012100.ASP] as a backdrop,
Georgia has agreed to participate in the joint operation.
The Russian component, the composition of which has yet to be
determined, must be flown into Georgia, because Russia does not
have land access to the border from the north. It is likely the
force will be based somewhere in Georgia. The logical headquarters
for the operation is the Russian base near the Georgian city of
Vaziani - the same base the Georgian government has doggedly tried
to wrest from Russian control for several years. Shevardnadze's
original position of refusing Russia access to its borders has
collapsed.
Georgia's agreement to participate in what is likely a Russian-
dominated operation on Georgian territory serves two purposes for
Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin. First, sealing the
Georgian border will finally prevent the Chechens from resupplying
their forces. This signals the beginning of the end of the Chechen
War.
Second, Georgia's decision informs Putin that the West will not
significantly intervene in his efforts to manipulate the states of
the South Caucasus into assisting him in eliminating the Chechen
rebels. For the last five months, Shevardnadze has sought Western
support to maintain Tbilisi's independent line vis-a-vis Moscow.
Having realized that Washington will not support him, he has
changed Georgian policy to placate Russia. The only way Georgia can
be prevented from falling back into Russia's orbit is if Turkey
establishes a military presence in Georgia - something that becomes
less likely with every passing day.
Other CIS states have noticed that the West has abandoned Georgia.
Normally independent-minded Uzbek President Islam Karimov recently
stated that if Islamic militants threatened his country, then
"Russia is a country we can rely on." Turkmenistan is also sounding
conciliatory toward Russia. It is now looking to Russia as a
petroleum export route after Azerbaijan rebuffed it in a pipeline
deal. Azerbaijan, too, is speaking of diversifying its oil export
routes to include additional Russian pipelines. This is a far cry
from its "Baku-Ceyhan or bust" rhetoric of the past several years.
The shift from a willingness to "observe the border" without
Russians to "secure the border" with Russians marks a
transformation in the Georgian government's perception of
geopolitical realities. Russia is economically and diplomatically,
and in the case of Georgia, militarily, reasserting its influence
in the states of the former Soviet south.
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