Chile
The Chilean independent newspaper "La Tercera de la Hora"
published an article on April 23 that claimed an extreme-right
wing group known as Anti-Revolutionary Forces - Freedom and
Fatherland (FAR-PL) is planning to destabilize the country by
engaging in assassinations of prominent political figures and
members of extreme leftist groups. The purpose of such a plot,
allegedly called Operation "Clean Up and Repatriate," is to
prove that Chile is ungovernable in the absence of General
Augusto Pinochet. According to the article, this campaign
already began with the resignation in March of Deputy Nelson
Avila from the Party for Democracy (PPD) in response to threats
by the FAR-PL to his personal safety. The paper also claimed
that, in the aftermath of Avila's resignation, the Chilean
government recognized the serious threat posed by the FAR-PL.
According to former National Intelligence Center (CNI) agents,
the FAR-PL consists of the former members of security agencies
who served under the military government and may even have
recruited currently active agents. "La Tercera" also alleges
that Chile's Police Intelligence Headquarters (Jipol) and the
Public Security Directorate have been aware of FAR-PL, its
structure, and its activities for several months. Following
Pinochet's arrest in Britain, the FAR-PL had, according to the
paper, intensified its ideology and managed to boost its
financial resources. Now, the ultra-right group is allegedly
ready to launch an "all or nothing" plan. Whether or not the
reports of this plot have any basis in reality is difficult to
determine. However, the timing of the allegations and their
nature deserve closer examination.
One possibility is that this alleged right-wing plot is merely
propaganda, created out of the feverish imagination of the ruling
Chilean leftists. Their goals might be, first, to frighten
moderates into supporting the regime in advance of the
approaching presidential primaries. Indeed, we have seen several
signs recently that suggest that the leftists, primarily the
ruling Socialist Party (PS), are maneuvering politically to
strengthen their electoral base. By raising the specter of a
right wing conspiracy, it is possible that some undecided voters
might join parties that are intent on forestalling such an event.
Indeed, on April 25, the Socialist Party President Ricardo Nunez
said his party was ready for a rapprochement with the military,
although not "Pinochet's military." Leaders of the Socialist
Party interpreted this comment as a message to the electorate
that the Party was now open to reconciliation with moderate
elements in the military.
The center-left government in Chile faces an extraordinarily
delicate situation. On the one hand, they would dearly love to
see Spain try and execute Pinochet for having committed crimes
against humanity; on the other, they must not appear to be eager
for this outcome. Abandoning Pinochet to his fate would
antagonize the right wing and the military. Therefore, the
center-left government has initiated new legal tactics.
Following the return of General Izurieta from Europe, Foreign
Minister Jose Miguel Insulza announced that Chile would submit a
request to the International Court of Justice to decide whether
Spain or Chile itself had the right to try Pinochet. This
initiative was aimed at "mending fences" with the military, and
shoring up its standing with moderates.
Given the center-left government's careful balancing act in
dealing with the Pinochet case, it has little to gain by
fabricating a right-wing conspiracy story for the press. Indeed,
the appearance of the report of a conspiracy would serve to
destabilize the regime, exacerbate conflict with the rightist
among the military and beyond, and ultimately drive foreigners to
seek other countries in which to invest. Whatever the short-term
advantage the Chilean regime might secure in seeking to discredit
its opponents by such a ploy, the longer term disadvantages are
numerous and substantial.
Given the political polarization in Chile, it makes some sense
that the FAR-PL or a group of its ilk is indeed plotting to
destabilize the country in an attempt to win Pinochet's freedom.
However, in an interview with the Spanish newspaper "El Pais" on
April 22, a top Chilean military official downplayed the
likelihood of a coup. Following his meeting with Pinochet and a
number of Britain's top leaders a week earlier, Chilean Army
General Ricardo Izurieta told "El Pais" that he did not believe
there was a possibility of a coup d'etat in Chile as a
consequence of the Pinochet case. Further support for his
assertion may be adduced from a significant difficulty associated
with the right-wing-conspiracy scenario. The FAR-PL would have
to be extremely incompetent to have its plot uncovered at this
time. Given the associations the FAR-PL allegedly has with the
security services in Chile, it is likely that this group would
know how to cover its tracks.
However, the threat of a coup plot can be nearly as effective as
an actual coup plot. It is possible that the extreme right
factions made up this conspiracy story and leaked it to the
press, in an attempt to pressure the international community,
mainly Spain and Britain, to soften their stance on Pinochet's
case. Their goal would have been to have him extradited to
Chile, a development which in turn would present the center-left
government with a hot political potato on the eve of the December
11 presidential elections. It is possible, therefore, that FAR-
PL or perhaps another right-wing military group planted this
piece of propaganda with the press as a way of threatening Spain
and Britain, and even the United States: the price of trying
Pinochet abroad is political instability in Chile itself.
On Jan. 16 law enforcement officials seized cocaine valued at about
$500 million in the Chilean Pacific port of Arica. The bust in
Chile is evidence of what anti-drug officials have suspected for
some time now: Drug cartels are using Chile and Argentina as
transit points for shipping narcotics to Europe and the United
States. Although it costs more than using a direct route,
traffickers believe it to be a less risky method of shipment.
Traffickers have gravitated toward Chile because shipments with a
Chilean inspection stamp arouse less suspicion and are less likely
to be searched by customs agents. A 1999 State Department report
said that Argentina and Chile are being used by drug cartels for
transit points due to the clean reputations of those countries. The
added cost of shipping narcotics via a less direct route is more
than compensated for by the loss of fewer shipments, especially
given the tremendous profit margins involved.
The Arica seizure confirms that this is the cartels' new strategy
for attempting to avoid law enforcement efforts. It is likely to
cause law enforcement assets to focus more attention on the
Southern Cone. Anti-drug agencies have already taken steps in that
direction. In 1999 the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) began
training an Argentine counter-narcotics unit known as the Northern
Border Task Force. This elite unit is charged with intercepting
drug shipments flowing through Argentina from Brazil, Paraguay,
Peru and Colombia.
The most immediate result of this additional pressure will be drug-
related crime and violence. Stepped up enforcement activities will
bring customs and anti-drug units in direct contact with
traffickers. Faced with this eventuality, traffickers will react
first by resorting to bribery and then using violence to protect
their routes and shipments. Drug cartels often overcome legal
entanglements by first offering money. If this is not enough to
secure cooperation, then the threat of physical harm is used.
As the cost of doing business in the Southern Cone increases, drug
chieftains will likely look for less expensive routes - often,
these are the ones that offer the least resistance. Using the
Southern Cone demonstrates that cartels can easily afford the added
cost of shipping drugs indirectly. Further, drug lords don't balk
at the prospect of paying thousands of extra dollars in bribes to
get drugs past customs. However, cartel chieftains cannot tolerate
losing multi-million dollar shipments, the end result of more law
enforcement activity in the Southern Cone. At some point the
cartels will decide to cut their losses and adopt a new strategy.
In part, this new strategy will undoubtedly entail avoiding - as
much as possible - counter-narcotics activities of the United
States in South America. U.S. assistance is an integral part of
counter-narcotics efforts in Latin America. The United States has
assets and funding that Latin American countries do not possess to
fight the drug war. In order to avoid losses to law enforcement
activities, traffickers are likely to shift activities to transit
countries that are less cooperative with the United States, such as
Venezuela.
Relations between Washington and Caracas are certainly not openly
hostile; however, there are signs of growing tension. Venezuelan
Foreign Minister Jose Vicente Rangel recently criticized the U.S.
ambassador over comments made by U.S. Under Secretary of State for
Latin America Peter Romero directed against the administration of
President Hugo Chavez. Immediately after Romero's inflammatory
remarks, Chavez himself made pointed retorts Feb. 2 about the
international community respecting Venezuela's sovereignty.
An incident more directly related to poor counter-narcotics
cooperation between the United States and Venezuela occurred last
May when a U.S. counter-narcotics aircraft was denied access to
Venezuelan airspace. Chavez was sending a message to the United
States that Venezuela will be responsible for guarding its own
borders without interference from Washington. This same sentiment
was reflected recently when Chavez refused to allow U.S. troops on
Venezuelan soil to aid in disaster relief operations. The
government accepted material assistance, but declined the offer of
U.S. soldiers to lend a helping hand in cleaning up after mudslides
and flooding devastated parts of the country.
Additional law enforcement activity in the Southern Cone region
will cause cartels to re-think their trafficking routes. But this
will not happen immediately. Until it does, Argentina and Chile
will have to endure the problems associated with drug trafficking.
Increased trafficking activity in the Southern Cone will bring the
same corruption and violence that plague Colombia and other
traditional transit countries. If drug lords stay true to form,
they will undoubtedly seek the path of least resistance in
transporting narcotics. With relations between the Washington and
Caracas increasingly tense, Venezuela could become the next target
country for shipping drugs out of South America.