Albania
Albanian Prime Minister Pandeli Majko resigned Oct. 25, officially
transferring power back into the hands of longtime arch rivals
Fatos Nano and Sali Berisha, who will now directly compete for
control of Albania. This event, the most recent in a chain of
Albanian political developments, will have ramifications for the
entire region. While NATO expects Albania to act as a unified
country, like it did during the Kosovo conflict, there is a new and
potentially violent disagreement developing between ethnic-Albanian
subgroups, which could easily spill into Kosovo.
Despite the international community's efforts to keep moderate
leaders in power, Albania has returned to the extremist pre-Kosovo
war leadership notorious for its internal feuding. This month, the
opposition Democratic Party elected former President Berisha to its
highest position. Soon after, the party began rallying for the
ruling Socialist Party to relinquish power in order to create a
coalition government and plan for early elections. The prime
minister did resign, but no coalition was offered. Now, much to
Berisha's dismay, former Prime Minister Nano - as the ruling
party's leader - will appoint a new prime minister, pending
presidential approval.
The return of Nano and Berisha to power heightens the danger of
political instability, both for Albania and the region. The feud
between their supporters runs far deeper than personal quarrels;
Nano and Berisha are merely representations of Albania's divided
ethnic groups, the Northern Ghegs and the Southern Tosks. Albania
has historically suffered a split between the mountainous North and
the more populated South. The Tosks generally support Nano and the
former communists. Berisha's supporters are mostly rural Ghegs.
During the Kosovo war, Albanian leaders managed to pull together in
support of their Kosovar Albanian neighbors, although their motives
were not completely selfless. Nano and Berisha personally gained
from the Kosovo conflict. Both leaders gained popularity by
exploiting the conflict. Berisha, who was in power at the time,
helped divert domestic attention from his failed economic scheme by
drawing international attention to Serb repression of ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo.
Albania's factions managed to cooperate for several reasons. First,
they all agreed that, with ethnic Albanians making up 92 percent of
the population, Kosovo should be saved from Serb repression.
Second, the conflict brought Albania much-needed international
financial assistance as a counter-balance to the huge influx of
Kosovar Albanian refugees. Third, a Kosovo free from Serb control
acts as a buffer zone, distancing the Albanians from their Serb
enemies. These reasons promoted the development of a temporary
cooperation between the Ghegs and the Tosks. The superficially
united Albania, brought together by the Kosovo conflict, no longer
exists now that the war is over.
With no war, the Tosks and the Ghegs have no reason to cooperate
and have reverted to their old feuds. However, now that Kosovo is
free from Serb rule, the balance of power between the two groups is
in danger. The Kosovar Albanians are Ghegs. If Berisha can
successfully cultivate them, he will gain thousands more followers,
including former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). He
would be in a position to launch a campaign against the Tosks,
igniting an ethnic war between the groups.
In the wake of Kosovo, NATO would likely interfere in the event of
an ethnic conflict. If NATO supported Berisha, it would be
supporting the ethnic Albanian population it supported in Kosovo,
along with the Albanian Ghegs. This would place NATO in support of
former KLA members, whom it has already allowed too much power. On
the other hand, if NATO sided with Nano, it would be supporting
communists as well as confronting the ethnic Albanian population it
supported in Kosovo. Neither choice is desirable.
During the Kosovo conflict, the Albanians seemed helpful and
generous as they took in refugees and supported their ethnic
Albanian neighbors. The international community thought it was
finally witnessing the emergence of a stable, almost healthy
Albania. However, the tables have turned, and Albania is set to
pull its neighbors into its own internal battle. NATO may again be
forced to choose the lesser of two evils in a distant ethnic clash.
The Albanian newspaper Koha Jone reported Jan. 29 that the head of
Albania's National Intelligence Service (ShIK), Fatos Klosi,
secretly met with Prime Minister Ilir Meta to brief him on the
possibility of an armed protest against government corruption. As
well, the Albanian newspaper Rilindja Demokratike reported four
days earlier that chairman of the opposition Democratic Party of
Albania (PD) Sali Berisha, in a speech to local officials in
northern Albania, had called for an uprising against government
corruption.
In a meeting with U.S. Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering
Jan. 31, Berisha reportedly accused the Albanian government of
involvement in contraband and corruption, and of the murder of PD
Deputy Azem Hajdari in September 1998. Pickering himself was in the
country to visit NATO support units in Albania and to discuss
government corruption with Albanian government officials.
These calls for an overthrow of the Albanian government are not the
first. In August 1998, the Albanian newspaper Shekulli reported
that former Albanian army officers, discharged following an
attempted coup in March 1997, were planning another attempt to
overthrow the government. Paving the way for the next round of
factional infighting, which had subsided during the NATO aerial
campaign against Kosovo, was Albanian Prime Minister Pandeli
Majko's resignation in October 1999.
[ http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/GIU/102799.ASP ]
However, unlike previous upsurges in instability, this new signal
could have ramifications outside of Albania and inside of Kosovo.
The stability of the NATO operation in Kosovo hinges on the
continued stability of the Albanian government. Albania has become
a major staging base for the 42,500 NATO troops deployed in Kosovo.
NATO support operations in Albania, known as Communication Zone
West (COMMZ W), totals 2,400 troops. Its primary mission is to
protect supply routes and communication lines between Albania and
Kosovo. The Italian-led mission also acts as a main logistics
pipeline for NATO's Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR), accounting
for 31 percent of total NATO support personnel divided among
Albania, Macedonia and Greece.
Albanian instability is an endemic problem. In all likelihood, as
before, the information in advance of planned demonstrations will
allow the Albanian