Afghanistan
On April 14, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl
Inderfurth told a Senate panel that the U.S. is convinced that
Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden is planning further attacks,
while Afghanistan's ruling Taleban, who have thus far provided
bin Laden with a safe haven, appear divided over whether or not
to hand bin Laden over to the U.S. "We feel very confident of
the charges we have made about bin Laden's active role in the
bombings that took place in East Africa, and we believe he is
planning further such terrorist action," Inderfurth said. "That
has given us a sense of urgency about bringing him to justice.
We believe the Taleban leadership is torn about how to deal with
him but they recognize that the cost of having him stay in
Afghanistan clearly outweighs over time the benefit of keeping
him there." Inderfurth then warned the Senate panel of a likely
upsurge in fighting in Afghanistan this spring. He said that,
"The Taleban seem to be readying their fighters for an all-out
blitz on the battlefield. Spring is the time when either the
fighting resumes or they take a different direction."
In related development, the London-based newspaper Al-Hayat ran a
story on April 19 about Ahmad Salama Mabrouk, a jailed member the
Egyptian militant group Al-Jihad. Al-Jihad is a member of bin
Laden's umbrella group International Islamic Front for Fighting
Jews and Crusaders (IIFFJC). Al-Hayat reported Mabrouk as saying
that not only does IIFFJC possess biological and chemical weapons
but it also is planning about "100 operations" against U.S. and
Israeli interests around the world. The report went on to state
that the details of these planned attacks were found on a
computer program, which was confiscated by the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in September 1998 at the time Mabrouk
was taken into custody in Azerbaijan.
More than just expressing its fears, the U.S. may be prepared to
act on them. On April 15, the Afghan newspaper "Wahdat" reported
that the U.S. is setting up secret bases on the Afghan border to
launch an operation against bin Laden. The newspaper also
confirmed that the U.S. had established contacts with some
Taleban leaders to seek their help in a possible operation to
capture bin Laden. This is not the first time allegations have
surfaced that U.S. commandos or agents have attempted to nab bin
Laden. Nor is it the first time -- each previous abduction
attempt apparently failing -- that the conclusion has been
reached that the U.S. needs the Taleban's help if it hopes to
capture the terrorist.
In the past, the U.S. has hinted at offering the Taleban
diplomatic recognition in exchange for handing over bin Laden to
U.S. custody. Thus far, the Taleban have rejected this offer,
however helpful to the Taleban position U.S. diplomatic
recognition would be. They have remained good Moslem hosts, even
though many in the Taleban have begun expressing reservations
about harboring him. Moreover, the U.S. has kept its offer of
recognition at the officially-denied hint level, due to concerns
about the Taleban's fundamentalist Islamic social policies.
Meeting in Islamabad on April 29, Pakistani Petroleum Minister
Nisar Ali Khan, Turkmen Deputy Prime Minister Batyr Sardjaev, and
Afghan Taleban Minister of Energy and Mines Maulvi Ahmedjan
agreed to revive a major gas pipeline project that had been
shelved due to the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan. The
proposed 1,400 kilometer pipeline would carry natural gas from
Turkmenistan's Daulatabad gas field across western and southern
Afghanistan to Lahore in Pakistan. The officials called on the
CENTGAS consortium to complete the groundwork for the project in
three months, in time for the next ministerial meeting on the
project.
The CENTGAS consortium consists of the Turkmen government,
Japan's Itochu and INPEX, South Korea's Hyundai, Pakistan's
Crescent, Russia's Gazprom, and Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil. Delta
will reportedly likely head up the consortium since the former
leader and main source of funds, the U.S. company UNOCAL, bailed
out of the project earlier this year due to continued instability
in Afghanistan and pressure from the U.S. government, which
opposed the Taleban's support for Saudi terrorist Osama bin
Laden. Khan said financing the US$1.9 billion project was "not a
major problem," suggesting that talks with Argentina's Bridas or
another major sponsor may be bearing fruit. And Sardjaev
suggested the project could be but the first of several cross-
Afghanistan pipelines.
The decision to revive the Daulatabad-Lahore pipeline would seem
to be a stunning show of optimism on the part of the
participants, considering that UN sponsored peace talks in the
Turkmen capital Ashkhabad between the Taleban and the opposition
Northern Alliance broke down on April 10. Both sides in the
talks reportedly suspected each other of preparing for a Spring
offensive, and in fact the Iranian-backed Hezb-i-Wahdat retook
the town of Bamiyan in a lightning attack on April 21. The
Taleban have reportedly recently received massive shipments of
arms and ammunition, as well as paramilitary troops, from their
sponsor Pakistan. Meanwhile, the Russian, Uzbek, and Iranian-
backed Northern Alliance, which controls the northeastern 10 to
25 percent of Afghanistan, has reportedly consolidated its
political and military position and is preparing for battle. And
Russia has reportedly constructed a military base on the Tajik-
Afghan border.
Yet despite apparent preparations for renewed fighting, there may
be hope for a settlement, or at least stasis, on the horizon.
First, Jane's Defense Weekly describes the Taleban preparations
as decidedly defensive, while the Los Angeles Times said the same
about the forces of the Northern Alliance's top military
commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud. Second, there have been
indications that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are willing to improve
relations with the Taleban if they would just expel bin Laden.
Third, the decision to revive the pipeline project comes just
days after the April 19-23 visit of Pakistani Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif to Moscow -- the first such high level talks between
the two countries in 25 years.
During a five day visit to Moscow, described by Pakistani
officials as a dramatic success, Sharif held talks with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov,
and Speaker of the Russian Duma Gennady Seleznev. The visit
resulted in bilateral agreements on trade and economic
cooperation, a decision to establish a joint economic, trade,
scientific, and technology commission, and a joint statement
calling for a peaceful negotiated settlement of South Asia's
conflicts. Both nations also granted each other most-favored
nation trade status.
Sharif's visit to Moscow was followed quickly by a visit of
Seleznev to Pakistan on April 27. Seleznev met with Pakistani
Parliament Speaker Elahi Bukhsh Soomro, calling on Pakistan to
press the Taleban for a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan and
the establishment of a coalition government. Soomroo said
Pakistan shared Moscow's desire for a representative multi-ethnic
government in Afghanistan. Seleznev also met with Pakistani
Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, with both men again calling for a
political resolution of the Afghan conflict. Seleznov also met
with Pakistani President Rafiq Tarar, and will reportedly meet
with Sharif before the end of his visit. On April 29, Seleznov
announced that Russia would help Pakistan launch its Badar-2
research satellite.
The Hezb-i-Wahdat attack clearly demonstrates that this Spring
will not be without fighting in Afghanistan. Moreover, while
Russian-Pakistani relations have taken a big step forward, there
remains friction between them, particularly over Russia's close
relations with India and Pakistan's support of Islamic
fundamentalist movements. But money, as they say, talks, and
movement on the pipeline project suggests that, while there may
be fighting, it is not expected to be the kind of sweeping
offensives that gave the Taleban nearly 90 percent of
Afghanistan. The apparent thaw in Russian-Pakistani relations
could have a dramatic impact on Central and South Asian
relations, with an Afghan settlement just the tip of the iceberg.
The Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) reported May 17 that the
ruling Taleban government has handed an official protest to
the Iranian embassy in Pakistan condemning incursions into
Afghanistan by Iranian forces on May 13 and May 16. Citing
unnamed Taleban officials, AIP reported that the letter was to
be delivered today. The statement said that Iranians armed
with heavy weapons had entered into the Afghani provinces of
Farah and Herat on May 13. It also said that on May 16,
Iranian troops were again seen crossing the border into Farah
province and they allegedly shelled the border towns of Qala-
e-Gah and Danabad in western Afghanistan. Some of the
shells also reportedly landed in Herat province.
The Taleban claim that the incursions were a result of a
Taleban victory, namely the capture of central Bamiyan
province on May 12. Bamiyan province had been the
stronghold of the Iranian-backed Hezb-e-Wahadat militia. The
statement concluded with a warning by the Taleban that such
intrusions could have "serious consequences." It urged
Tehran to end the operations immediately and, failing that, the
Taleban would be compelled to take retaliatory measures,
adding "we will not be held responsible for the
consequences."
The Iranian Foreign Ministry immediately responding to the
AIP reports said, "We are not aware of such attacks but will
investigate and if necessary issue a relevant statement."
However, the Iranian "Khorassan" newspaper reported that 27
Afghans, described as "armed bandits" were killed in the past
two days during an extensive Iranian military operation in the
east of the country. The paper said that the "bandits" were
killed during an operation that succeeded in freeing five
Iranian nationals who had allegedly been taken hostage by
Afghans. It reported that the operation was carried out by a
battalion of the regular Iranian army in Torbat-e-Heydarieh
region, close to the border with Afghanistan and added that
the operation would continue until the entire region had been
"cleansed." Stratfor notes that "armed bandits" is a term
generally used in Iran to refer to drug-traffickers from
Afghanistan, who may or may not be Afghans themselves.
Relations between the Taleban and Iran have always been
uneasy. Last year the two were at the brink of open warfare
following the killing of seven Iranian diplomats and an Iranian
journalist by renegade Taleban troops during the Taleban
takeover of the northern Afghani town of Mazar-e-Sharif. Two
Iranian diplomats managed to escape and returned to
Teheran where they reported that the Taleban were
responsible. In response, Iran deployed 200,000 soldiers to
its eastern border with Afghanistan, prompting a diplomatic
initiative by the United Nations to ease tensions between the
two countries.
Iran threatened all out war unless another 50 of its nationals
taken prisoner during the takeover were released. Teheran
said the prisoners were truck drivers and traders doing
business in northern Afghanistan. The Taleban replied by
charging that the men were spies who were supplying arms
and ammunition to the opposition Northern Alliance forces,
which includes the Hezb-e-Wahadat militia. Tensions
eventually subsided between the Taleban and Iran as fighting
ceased for the winter between the Northern Alliance and
Taleban forces, with the Taleban firmly in control of over 90
percent of the country.
In the last few weeks, with the beginning of the spring thaw,
fighting resumed. Today, Taleban jet fighters today bombed
opposition positions near Dar-e-Suf, a district that links
Bamiyan province to Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. The Taleban
say they are in control of Dar-e-Suf, but opposition soldiers
say fighting in the area is intense and they currently are
holding about 80 percent of the district. Dar-e-Suf is the last
remaining Northern Alliance stronghold and is Afghanistan's
only remaining Shiite-dominated area and, significantly, it is
the last remaining bastion of the Hezb-e-Wahadat.
With the last remaining Hezb-e-Wahadat stronghold being
bombed and besieged by Taleban forces, the Taleban claim
that Iranian forces crossed into Afghanistan is highly plausible.
In fact, during the 1998 buildup of Iranian forces along the
Afghan border, the Taleban offensive was forced to a
standstill until winter set in as the militia hurried to create a
static defensive line along its western border to face a
possible Iranian invasion. In doing so, the Taleban were
forced to divide their forces which, had they remained in tact,
could have delivered a coup de grace to the Northern
Alliance in the north.
It seems that Iran, either intentionally or unintentionally, is
reviving its pressure on the Afghan frontier. And regardless
of the cover story, Teheran's incursions are certain to have a
similar affect. Instead of moving tens of thousands of troops
to the border and threatening war, Iran is now engaged in
raiding, a tactic which the Iranians hope will draw off Taleban
forces from the front-lines and degrade their ability to
concentrate enough forces to defeat completely the Northern
Alliance. This sort of tactic can be easily hidden under the
guise of an anti-narcotic sweep, or an anti-kidnapping
operation, without much trouble. While it is not entirely clear
that these are the true intentions of the Iranians, it is again
certainly a plausible explanation. Whatever the case may be -
- intentional raids, or unintentional cross-border incidents --
what is certain is that this new year along the Afghanistan-
Iranian frontier is shaping up to be almost as harrowing as the
last one.
Afghanistan's ruling Taliban government has become
uncharacteristically conciliatory over the last week. It promised
on July 26 to hand over Pakistani nationals wanted by Islamabad.
The same day, the Afghan ambassador to Pakistan guaranteed a
Chinese delegation that no groups would be allowed to operate
against China from Afghanistan. The Taliban's diplomatic offensive
is the clearest signal to date that at least some elements of the
Taliban's leadership are willing to work out a Chinese-sponsored
peace deal in Afghanistan. Such an arrangement would have two
immediate effects -a diplomatic squall between China and Russia and
a number of homeless terrorists.
Taliban diplomatic officials sought out a Chinese delegation in
Islamabad, Pakistan, on July 25. The fact that the Taliban went to
the Chinese, instead of the Russians, indicates how badly some
factions of the Taliban want China to take the lead in ending the
Afghan civil war. Russia has an interest in keeping Central Asia
unstable, ensuring that its former republics continue in their
dependence upon Russian military support.
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China and Russia both agree on the need to end, or at least
contain, the Afghan war, but they have decidedly different ideas
about how to do so. Russia currently has more at stake than China -
it alleges that Chechen rebels are being trained in Afghanistan.
Moscow therefore has threatened airstrikes on Afghanistan and has
asked Uzbekistan to allow anti-Taliban Gen. Rashid Dostam to set up
a base near the border, according to the Far Eastern Economic
Review.
China is concerned about Afghan support for Islamic militants in
the western province of Xinjiang, but that is a much less pressing
problem than Chechnya. Instead, the Chinese government is working
with Pakistan and Iran to bring a negotiated settlement. Besides
ending the war, China wants to cement its relationship with Iran.
Beyond the dispute over methodology, Moscow and Beijing disagree
about regional primacy - who will call the shots in Central Asia.
If Russia controls the Afghan situation, it sets the agenda for the
region - fighting Islamic militants. Steady fighting will hamstring
economic development for the region, but Russia would remain in the
driver's seat. China's plans are based on economic links between
Central Asia and Iran, Pakistan and China.
Much of the Taliban leadership would rather make a deal with the
Chinese than get bombed by the Russians, which explains this week's
entreaties. A final agreement would likely leave a portion of
Afghanistan under the control of the opposition Northern Alliance.
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For more on Afghanistan, see:
http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/countries/Afghanistan/default.htm
For more on China, see:
http://www.stratfor.com/asia/countries/china/default.htm
For more on Pakistan, see:
http://www.stratfor.com/asia/countries/pakistan/default.htm
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Much of the Taliban would likely accept a negotiated deal, provided
it maintained control over the majority of the country. Pakistan,
the Taliban's major sponsor, wants a stable border and economic
transit routes. The same goes for Iran, which supports some
factions of the Northern Alliance. The only question is whether the
Northern Alliance and its Russian sponsor will accept the deal.
And not all of the Taliban thinks alike. Dissent is increasing
between factions who want the war to continue and those who would
compromise. A major Taliban commander, Bashir Baghlani, was
arrested this week for allegedly making contact with the Northern
Alliance. Regional media also reported a minor uprising against the
Taliban in eastern Afghanistan over the weekend.
Let's assume, for a moment, that the pro-settlement faction of the
Taliban is strong enough to subdue its radical brethren and make a
deal with China. Since Pakistan, the Taliban's major sponsor, seems
to consider China an ally, it is far easier to cut a deal than to
continue fighting without Pakistani supplies and support. A deal
would bring about two short-term effects.
First, relations between China and Russia would drop to even lower
levels. China would have a terrible time convincing Russia to go
along with a peace agreement. If Moscow accepts, it will do so
grudgingly, and probably under sufficient duress or inducements -
either way the relationship suffers. If Russia rejects a peace
deal, China's hard-fought plan will be ruined.
Second, China, Russia and even the United States will demand that
the radical Taliban, which runs terrorist centers inside
Afghanistan, be suppressed or expelled - including such luminaries
as Osama bin Laden. This is a basic precursor for any sort of
commercial life in the country. Deprived of a sanctuary, the
fighters will be insecure and homeless until they find a new base
of operations.
Peace in Afghanistan boils down to a contest of wills between
Asia's two great powers, and the ball is in Russia's court. One
bombing run can undo any hope of an agreement and will sink
relations between Beijing and Moscow. Ultimately, Russia can't
afford to let China gain an economic hold on Central Asia, and it
will take the necessary steps to stop that from happening.