NATO

NATO has won the 1999 Serbian War. Of that there can be no doubt. There are two questions to be asked. First, how did it manage to win the war? Second, what are the ramifications of this victory? NATO did not win the war militarily. It won the war with a breathtaking diplomatic performance in the last week that was duplicitous, disingenuous, and devious--precisely what brilliant diplomacy is supposed to be. Yet, at the same moment that NATO's diplomacy snatched victory from the jaws of military stalemate, its very characteristics have set the stage for an ongoing and perhaps insoluble problem not only in the Balkans, but within the councils of NATO and ultimately, in the global geopolitical reality.

The issue of whether NATO won the war militarily will be debated for many years. The question of air power's efficacy is always debated with religious zeal. In this case, the question comes down to this: why did Slobodan Milosevic agree to the G-8 accords during his meeting with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari? Was it because he could no longer resist militarily? Was it because the cost to Serbia of the air campaign had become unsupportable? Was it because he felt that he had achieved all that he could achieve militarily to that point? In other words, did Milosevic think he was capitulating or did he think he was reaching a satisfactory political settlement?

Certainly, the ability of Serbia's ground forces to resist a NATO invasion of Kosovo had not been degraded sufficiently to permit NATO to enter the "permissive environment" it required. When Serb military negotiators broke off talks on June 6, NATO forces milled about along the Kosovo border awaiting Serb permission for NATO forces to enter. When French forces entered Kosovo a week later, they reported formidable defenses along the Albanian-Kosovo border, and expressed relief at not having to face them. Thus, unlike the Iraqi war of 1991, there can be no argument that NATO's air power had defeated Serbia's ground forces in Kosovo or elsewhere. Serbia's ability to resist NATO's entrance into Kosovo remained intact.

The next question about air power is whether it had imposed strategic and economic costs on Belgrade that were unbearable and whether these forced Milosevic to capitulate? This is an important question, since air power theorists since Douhet have argued that air power could achieve this goal, yet conventional air power appears to fall consistently short of achieving this mission. Since military strategies and budgets depend on how this question is answered, interpreting the origins of Milosevic's actions is far from an academic issue. It is an important and difficult question.

This is hard to answer because, in part, it depends on what was going through Milosevic's mind when he agreed to the G-8 terms for ending the war. But the very nature of the question we pose points us in the direction of the answer. Since we need to wonder what went through Milosevic's mind, it is clear we are trying to figure out the reasons for his actions. Implicitly, the very question means that Milosevic had a choice. If he had a choice that means that the weight of the air war was not so unbearable that he could not endure it. At the same time, maybe Milosevic chose not to endure it. In other words, air power had not broken Serbia's will, but the price may have been too high to endure, particularly when alternatives were available them.

This is, we believe, the best case that can be made for the success of the air war. That any case exists is remarkable, since the air war was badly architected and conceived from the beginning. There were insufficient forces in theater to carry out the sort of overwhelming strike that NATO air planners felt was required even to open the possibility of shattering Serbia's will to resist. The buildup of air forces went too slowly. At no point did available forces begin to approach the forces available in Desert Storm, in spite of the fact that terrain, weather, and the correlation of forces required larger, rather than smaller, forces. The air campaign was controlled by civilians who triggered it without sufficient planning and preparation, without providing minimal resources, and without permitting a target set and tempo of operations capable of fulfilling the mission. The Kosovo air campaign was not and can not be a fair test of air power.

That said, it follows that the more extreme claims being made for the success of the air campaign are unreasonable. The air campaign did not in any sense conform to air power theory. Assertions that in spite of all of its defects, it compelled Milosevic to capitulate are, oddly enough, attacks on air power theorists. If this air campaign was enough to break Milosevic, then air campaign strategists themselves have vastly underestimated the impact of air power. The Kosovo campaign was the polar opposite of what an air campaign, in theory, required. Air power theorists have no reason to defend this campaign and defending it undermines much of their theory.

The critical point is that the air campaign did not leave Milosevic without options. There is no doubt that he could have endured the campaign that was underway for many months. Milosevic did not act as he did because the air campaign had crippled him. Milosevic acted as he did because it appeared to him that a satisfactory diplomatic resolution was available and because he believed the geopolitical situation had developed in an unfavorable direction. Given that the broader strategic environment was moving against him and a diplomatic option was available, it made no sense to prolong the war.

The shift in the strategic environment was, obviously, the fall of Primakov and the increasing unreliability of Russia as Serbia's patron. The diplomatic solution was the G-8 compromise, which was understood to differ fundamentally from the Rambouillet accord. As the G-8 was written, Milosevic's acceptance of it did not mean a capitulation to NATO, but the acceptance of an international peacekeeping force under UN control, enabled by a UN Security Council resolution. Since Serbia had accepted the principle of a foreign presence in Kosovo, but objected to a purely NATO presence, the G-8 accords seemed to achieve Milosevic's primary objectives.

NATO, mainly the U.S. and U.K., went into action the minute Milosevic accepted the compromise. First, NATO created a public atmosphere in which it successfully portrayed Milosevic's acceptance of G-8 as its own victory. What began as a public relations campaign designed for domestic consumption, was rapidly transformed into the accepted reality. In a brilliant, global public relations campaign, the U.S. and U.K. convinced even the Serb public that Milosevic had surrendered. Milosevic found himself trapped in a reality created by NATO.

Behind the atmospherics, there was a defining military reality. NATO could not enter Kosovo unless the Serbs permitted it. However, once NATO was in Kosovo, the Serbs lost their ability to resist. NATO had to convince the Serbs to allow it to enter Kosovo, past their frontier defenses. Once inside, Serb troops were immediately helpless, having given up not only their terrain force multipliers, but also having their lines of supply and communications shattered and their forces enveloped in mobile operations. The key was to get the Serbs to permit entry.

From the collapse of the border negotiations with Serbian generals on the evening of June 6 until the entry of NATO forces on the morning of June 13, NATO diplomats brilliantly manipulated, by completely confusing, the situation. For example, they agreed to enable the Security Council resolution called for by the G-8 accords. They agreed to give the UN control over civil administration. They agreed to extensions in the Serb pullout. They agreed to a Russian presence in Kosovo. They agreed with everything, yet gave away nothing. Their goal was simple: to get NATO troops into Kosovo. NATO understood that once that was achieved, NATO would run Kosovo, regardless of agreements.

The critical part of these maneuvers was to keep the Russians under control. It was, after all, the intervention of a Russian officer that scuttled the June 5-6 discussions. NATO knew that nothing it did would satisfy all of the Russians. Therefore, its goal was to split the Russians into as many camps as possible and to isolate hard liners. NATO simply had to impress on Milosevic that the Russians were not prepared to enforce the accords they had themselves negotiated in Bonn on May 3.

Milosevic and his generals, helpless amidst the political forces unleashed by NATO, reached out to supportive Russian factions for help. This led to the Russian intervention in Pristina and NATO's diplomacy's finest hour. Rather than treating the intervention as a dangerous crisis, NATO carried on with its basic three-part program. First, it declared the intervention unimportant, and once again, image became reality. Second, it isolated the Russian force strategically, tactically, and politically. Surrounding countries refused to permit overflights, NATO troops rolled around them, and NATO's allies in the Kremlin hemmed in NATO's foes. Third, and most important, by ignoring the Russian intervention, NATO got what it wanted: its troops passed into Kosovo, behind the mountains and minefields that had blocked them.

Indeed, the Russian intervention actually helped NATO to get in. Serb military leaders, with misplaced confidence in the Russian military's will to confront NATO, committed a fatal error. They permitted NATO troops to cross the border on schedule. In fact, they were eager for NATO troops to enter, expecting a confrontation between them and the Russian forces. This would give Serb troops the opportunity to join with reinforced Russian troops and compel NATO to face war or retreat.

Instead, NATO used its influence in Moscow to limit the Pristina force to a symbolic gesture. NATO then proceeded to surround, isolate, and ignore the Russians. Russian forces at Pristina, rather than becoming the trigger of a NATO-Russian confrontation, became benignly treated hostages. NATO forces, now deep in Kosovo, proceeded to impose the NATO occupation that Milosevic had resisted and that the G-8 accords seemed to have avoided. Once NATO got Serbia to allow a "permissive" entry into Kosovo, NATO was in control.

This was brilliant diplomacy. The simple fact is that having blundered into a war they didn't really want, without a prepared military force or a coherent strategic plan, Clinton, Blair, Albright, Berger, Cook, Robertson and the rest in the end ran a clinic in diplomacy. They turned a badly stalemated military operation that was going nowhere into victory. The end game provides a textbook in the use of diplomacy for retrieving poor strategic positions. Even more than a victory for NATO, this was a victory for the Anglo-American coalition that drove this war.

And therein lies the tale. Everything has a cost. The first price that NATO must pay is the victory itself. It now controls Kosovo. That is a booby prize if there ever was one. Second, NATO is now responsible for the stability of the whole of the Balkan peninsula. What the Austro-Hungarians and the Turks found undigestible NATO will now try to digest. The Balkans is a region whose very geography breeds insecure states without room for viable compromises. It can be done, but the mission is, in the long run, always exhausting. On the bright side, NATO now has a full-time mission to keep it occupied.

NATO's greatest price will be paid in NATO itself. Gerhard Schroeder has tried to put a good face on it, but the Germans were and remain appalled by the risks the Anglo-Americans forced Germany to accept in relation to the Russians. Schroeder insisted on Friday that Russia should be treated with "respect," a code word for avoiding another such confrontation. Germany cannot afford another episode of Anglo-American diplomatic brilliance. Thus, when Schroeder said last week that: "Human rights are and should be inviolable," but that "we have to look at issues very closely and in fact differentiate between different situations," he was announcing that it would be a long time before Germany tried this again. He went on to say that NATO action should be "confined to its own territory and that should continue to be its way." After Kosovo, a compliant Germany within NATO simply should not be taken for granted any longer.

The Kosovo affair carries with it another price: it has intensified the process in which reformers are losing out to communists and nationalists. Kosovo was beyond Russia's reach. There are areas that are very much within its reach, such as the Baltics, Ukraine, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. NATO has established a precedent: it can intervene in other countries so long as human rights issues justify it. Human rights violations abound in the former Soviet Union. As hard liners inexorably increase their power in the Kremlin, NATO will have provided them with full justification for intervention in areas where they have the upper hand and NATO is without options. If suffering humanity is a justification for war, NATO just gave Russia the moral basis for reclaiming its empire. And it should be remembered that Russia may not be able to take on NATO, but Lithuania or Uzbekistan have a different correlation of forces, to say the least.

NATO has clearly won a victory and the diplomats have been instrumental. However, it is a victory in which the price will be, we think, higher than anyone anticipated or would have been willing to pay at the beginning of the war. NATO came out of the war internally weaker than it went in. Russia and China came out of the war more, rather than less, hostile. The stability of the Balkans is now a permanent and impossible responsibility for the West. It was a victory. A few more victories like this and....

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Yugoslavia's official Tanjug news agency announced Dec. 28 that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic had promoted a number of officers [ http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c0001040104.htm ], raising some to the rank of general, reshuffled a number of senior commands and decorated military units and individuals. The announcement came just four days after Yugoslavia's parliament adopted its 2000 budget. The parliament had allocated 73 percent of the $1.94 billion total to finance the Yugoslav army. A week earlier, the Serbian assembly had adopted the republic's 2000 budget of $2.49 billion, of which nearly 25 percent was earmarked for the Milosevic-controlled police force.

Two days after the announcement about the military, on Dec. 30, Milosevic said that Yugoslavia was determined to hold onto Kosovo. In an interview with the Politka daily, as reported by Tanjug, Milosevic said that the presence of NATO troops in the Serbian province was "temporary." Reviving his nationalistic rhetoric, he said, "We must put up with it and show great patience." He added, "no one can take Kosovo from us."

Milosevic's comments reiterated those of Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic, head of Yugoslavia's Third Army, who said two weeks ago that his troops would go back into Kosovo, probably in June, as authorized by a NATO agreement with Yugoslavia reached at the conclusion of last year's war.

Playing into Milosevic's hand, U.S. Gen. Wesley Clark, supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe, immediately ruled out any return of the Yugoslav army to Kosovo, in an interview released the same day. Clark told the Montenegrin weekly newspaper Monitor that "the Yugoslav Army will not be authorized to return to Kosovo." He said, "If by chance it tries, it will be prevented."

Nevertheless, under the June 15, 1999, military technical agreement between NATO and Belgrade, and the subsequent Annex 2 of U.N. resolution 1244, a small, lightly armed contingent of Yugoslav soldiers and police is authorized to return to Kosovo in June 2000 to guard cultural sites and Yugoslavia's borders as well as aid in the clearing of minefields.

In making these aggressive statements, Milosevic is invoking a familiar strategy of generating nationalistic fervor to detract attention from serious domestic problems, such as the reconstruction of critical infrastructure and the revitalization of the economy. Milosevic has consistently attempted to provoke the United States into a diplomatic confrontation in order to maintain his position of power. To this point, he has succeeded in turning the sanctions, the possible succession of Montenegro and the continued violence in Kosovo to his favor. When a crisis isn't pressing, Milosevic raises the public's awareness of the NATO intervention by holding awards ceremonies and having the Yugoslav army hold special operations and army training exercises, some near the Kosovo border. [ http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c9912032031.htm ].

However, this new round of confrontation with the West is different due to the re-emergence of Russia in Yugoslav diplomacy. On Dec. 22, four days after Duma elections, in a key victory for interim Russian President Vladimir Putin and the nationalist centrist movement in Russia, Russian policy toward Kosovo began to shift.

ITAR-Tass news agency reported Dec 22 that the head of the Defense Ministry's Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov, said that Russia "will revise the forms and degree of its participation," if NATO does not comply with its obligations. However, he added, "Russia is not considering any ways of its withdrawal and exit from Kosovo."

NATO's agreement in Kosovo was to let the Yugoslav army eventually return. Ivashov made it clear that if NATO doesn't live up to its agreement, Russia would not withdraw troops but may "stop cooperating."

Not coincidentally, the next day Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, at the head of a delegation of Russian officers, arrived in Belgrade for talks with Milosevic focused on bilateral relations, Kosovo and other issues affecting southeastern Europe. At a military reception in Beli Dvor following talks, Milosevic decorated prominent Russian officers for their contribution to the development of relations between the armed forces of the two countries. Milosevic also awarded Sergeyev and Gen. Anatoly Kvashnin the Yugoslav Star Order of the First Degree.

On Dec. 24, Sergeyev met with Gen. Klaus Reinhardt, the commander of NATO's KFOR peacekeeping troops, in Kosovo's capital of Pristina. He reiterated the clause in the military-technical agreement, allowing the Yugoslav army and police to return to Kosovo. As well, on Dec. 30 - the same day Milosevic vowed to re- enter Kosovo and Clark vowed to stop him if he tried - Yugoslav Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic said that Yugoslavia would seek greater military cooperation with Russia to boost its capability. The Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti also reported that same day that Sergeyev had discussed the possible shipment of modern Russian anti-aircraft missiles and Sukhoi-27 and MiG-29 combat planes during his recent visit to Yugoslavia.

To a lesser degree, these developments point to a small domestic victory for Milosevic by detracting attention away from Yugoslavia's economic woes. It is also a victory for Russian nationalists disenchanted by Yeltsin's capitulation to the West over Kosovo. Also, it puts the Russians in a strong position in Yugoslavia through threats to pullout of the international peacekeeping force. It provides them with a lever to use against NATO and especially the United States. But most importantly, for both Russia and Yugoslavia, these moves put the United States and the rest of NATO in an awkward position, forcing NATO to choose between adhering to or breaking the military technical agreement.

NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC), in its simultaneous capacity as the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), is meeting March 1-2. Composed of ambassadorial-level representatives of the alliance's 19 member states, the NAC is the alliance's principal decision- making body. The NUC, in turn, was formed in 1997 to bring the alliance closer to Ukraine. With mixed success, NATO and Ukraine have attempted to foster a closer relationship. What is significant now is the location of the meeting. The alliance's decision-makers are meeting in Kiev, not Brussels, the headquarters.

As striking as the location - in the most strategically important nation on the periphery of Russia - is the timing. The meeting appears to have been called in Kiev on relatively short notice. And it is taking place as Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin consolidates both his power and his foreign policy; the March presidential elections are approaching, and until now, the West has appeared bewildered by his actions both abroad and in the war in Chechnya. With this gathering, it appears that the alliance is sending two sharp messages: one of support to Kiev and one of warning to Moscow.

NATO's relationship with Russia has changed dramatically and has not truly recovered from the trough of last year's conflict over Kosovo. Russia under former President Boris Yeltsin opened to the West and is now afflicted with a criminalized economy, a demoralizing loss of status and a dangerously ragged strategic situation along its borders. Russia under Putin is not only increasingly nationalist at home - as in the war in Chechnya - but is pursuing a vastly different foreign policy abroad, one that is forceful and decidedly independent of the West.

Indeed, it appears that after standing by idly the last several months, Western governments are beginning to catch on and react - albeit cautiously, even timidly. Western institutions are launching initiatives around the Russian periphery. The European Union is accelerating its expansion, earmarking $1 billion for Poland's accession efforts last week - a quadrupling of previous outlays. European Commission President Romano Prodi has alluded to tighter links between the EU and NATO. NATO holds its first major military exercise in a non-member's territory, in Sweden June 3-19. The alliance is cooperating with neutral nations to arm the Baltic states as well. And at the other end of Europe, Turkey is engaging in intensive military exercise on its eastern border.

But the most striking aspect of the relationship between the alliance, in particular, and Russia revolves around Ukraine. Ukraine is the most strategically important piece of real estate between Europe and Russia; neither can be secure without Ukraine. And throughout the post-Cold War period, Ukraine has been contested. It is economically dependent on Russia but has insisted on ever closer ties with the West.

Much to Russia's dismay, NATO and Ukrainian forces have held joint military exercises on the Black Sea and at a number of locations ashore. NATO and Ukraine have also been busy building relationships between their respective officer corps. The Ukrainiain military has never made a secret of its desires to work with the West, recently and pointedly declining a role in exercises with the Russian navy, according to Deutsch Presse-Agentur. Ukrainian forces, however, will participate in NATO's Cooperative Partner 2000 naval exercises, June 19-30, in the Ukrainian sector of the Black Sea.

The NATO-Ukraine Commission has been the other important vehicle for security cooperation. Indeed, one of the commission's first actions, after being formed three years ago, was to establish the Yavoriv military facility in western Ukraine as a training center for the Partnership for Peace program - the first such facility in the former Soviet Union. Ever since, Yavoriv has served as a base of operations for NATO-sponsored exercises. Now, NATO's civilian leadership arrives not only to meet but to tour a variety of facilities.

It appears that this unusual meeting was called on comparatively short notice; the first word appears to have come in late 1999, according to spokesmen in Brussels, Washington and various embassies. This suggests that the meeting is an outgrowth of the events of late last year: when Russia's war in Chechnya was getting underway and senior U.S. officials toured alarmed, neighboring nations. The decision to meet in Kiev indicates a desire on the part of NATO to send a message of support to Ukraine as well as a warning to Moscow.

It is likely that this warning will be counterproductive. Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov visited Kiev on Feb. 22, in an apparent attempt to deepen Russia's influence over the Ukrainian economy. After all, Putin, the acting Russian president, draws support from the swells of Russian nationalism. An overly bold Western gesture in Ukraine - perceived as vital by Russians - will only strengthen nationalists. Further, a strategy of confrontation will likely cause stress fractures within the alliance. Also, the West has yet to offer the carrot as well as the stick; Putin will refuse to back down if the only option is resorting to a Yeltsin foreign policy.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma seems to be scrabbling to stay out of this brewing confrontation. Last week he left Kiev for a two-week vacation in western Ukraine, according to a spokeswoman, directing his foreign minister to deliver a speech to the NATO gathering on his behalf. Neither in one camp nor the other, Ukraine has been forced to gingerly tow a line between Moscow and Brussels. With both now openly competing for Ukraine, Kuchma will find it increasingly difficult - if not impossible - to maintain a balanced policy.

Curiously, Moscow has not officially responded to the NAC meeting. After meeting with Russian officials, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping is currently en route from Moscow to Washington; he is likely to carry at least a partial Russian response. Russia seems to be waiting for the right time and place to voice its full retort.

Like NATO, Russia has many cards to play. Ukraine's Russian minority composes more than a quarter of the Ukrainian population. Russian security services undoubtedly retain a strong presence. In case of a conflict, no one in Kiev truly knows who would rally behind the flag. Russian influence over Ukraine's economy is deepening. Most importantly, despite the sheer size of Ukraine's territory and population, it still shares a long and nearly indefensible border with the Soviet Union's most powerful successor state: Russia.

A showdown is quietly brewing. NATO is trying to expand its ability to operate jointly with the forces of neutral nations and many former Soviet states. But it would be a high-profile NATO push into Ukraine that would ultimately tip the scale. Putin has decided that Russia will no longer play second fiddle to the West; the Western response is that if Russia wants a confrontation, one can most certainly be provided. Such a message will only further fuel Russia's nationalist fires.